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NOTES 
FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 804(b)(1)’S 
“SIMILAR MOTIVE” TEST AND THE 
ADMISSIBILITY OF GRAND JURY TESTIMONY 
AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT 
Brandon Berkowski* 
 
This Note examines the “similar motive” test of Federal Rule of Evidence 
804(b)(1) as applied to grand jury testimony offered against the 
government.  Rule 804(b)(1) admits an unavailable witness’s prior 
testimony hearsay when its opponent had a “motive” to develop it at the 
previous proceeding that was “similar” to the motive its opponent would 
have at trial.  However, the U.S. Courts of Appeals have differed in their 
interpretation of the rule’s “similar motive” language with respect to the 
factors that judges should consider in the admissibility analysis for grand 
jury testimony offered against the government.  This Note examines the 
development and purpose of the prior testimony hearsay exception as well 
as recent circuit court cases that have applied Rule 804(b)(1) to grand jury 
testimony offered against the government.  It argues that certain factors 
commonly considered by courts—primarily prosecutors’ strategic use of 
grand jury questioning—are beyond the scope of Rule 804(b)(1) and should 
not influence the “similar motive” inquiry.  This Note proposes an 
admissibility test for exculpatory grand jury testimony that avoids 
consideration of these factors. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1) is a hearsay exception governing the 
admissibility of an unavailable witness’s testimony from a prior 
proceeding.1  The reliability of prior testimony and the fairness of 
introducing it against a party depend primarily on whether the opposing 
party had a chance at the prior proceeding to question the witness about the 
issues now relevant at trial.2  According to the rule, prior testimony is not 
admissible unless the party against whom it is offered had “an opportunity 
and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect 
examination.”3  Although this language clearly expresses the root purpose 
of the exception—to protect a party from the admission of a witness’s past 
testimony unless the party had a meaningful chance to question the witness 
at the prior proceeding4—it has proved to be a challenging test for courts to 
apply.5 
Since the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals have split in their application of Rule 804(b)(1) to grand jury 
testimony that the defendant offers against the government in a criminal 
trial.6  The factual circumstances underlying the split typically arise under 
 
 1. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1). 
 2. See id. advisory committee’s note (equating direct and redirect examination with 
cross-examination for the purpose of this exception and explaining that fairness prohibits the 
introduction of prior testimony against a party who did not examine the declarant); 
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165 (1970) (reasoning that prior testimony that was 
subject to cross-examination was sufficiently reliable to be admitted at trial); JACK B. 
WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE MANUAL ¶ 14.01[01][c] (1987) 
(explaining the importance of adversarial examination in assuring the credibility of a 
witness’s testimony). 
 3. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1). 
 4. See 4 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 
§ 804.02[4] (9th ed. 2006) (“The similar motive inquiry is essentially a hypothetical one:  is 
the motive to develop the testimony at the prior time similar to the motive that would exist if 
the declarant were produced (which of course he is not) at the current trial or hearing?”); 
Michael M. Martin, The Former-Testimony Exception in the Proposed Federal Rules of 
Evidence, 57 IOWA L. REV. 547, 557 (1972) (“In determining whether the prior examination 
was adequate to protect the interest of the opponent in the present case, the only question . . . 
is whether the examiner had ‘motive and interest [for developing the testimony] similar to 
those of the party against whom now offered.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Rule 
804(b)(1) as originally promulgated by the U.S. Supreme Court, discussed infra at note 100 
and accompanying text)). 
 5. See 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 304, at 355–56 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 
2006) (explaining that “the Circuits appear divided as to whether in typical grand jury 
situations exculpatory testimony meets this [‘similar motive’] requirement of the Rule”); 
Martin, supra note 4, at 557 (explaining that the common law formulation of the exception 
was easier to apply than the Federal Rule, in part because the Rules’ drafters provided no 
criteria to guide judges in its application). 
 6. See 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 304, at 355 (describing this split); see also infra 
Part II. 
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similar circumstances.7  The government conducts a grand jury 
investigation seeking the indictment of one or more suspects.8  At some 
point during the investigation, either before or after an indictment is 
returned, the prosecution calls a witness who offers testimony favorable to a 
suspect.9  At trial, the defense subpoenas this grand jury witness, but the 
witness invokes the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination 
and refuses to testify.10  The government, which may have obtained the 
witness’s prior testimony by granting the witness immunity at the grand 
jury proceeding, refuses to grant immunity at trial.11  The defense then 
seeks to introduce the witness’s exculpatory grand jury testimony pursuant 
to Rule 804(b)(1), and the court must decide whether the prosecution’s 
motive for challenging the testimony at the grand jury was similar to the 
motive it would have if the witness appeared at trial.12 
The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second and First Circuits have 
construed the rule’s “similar motive” requirement narrowly in the grand 
jury context and issued decisions suggesting that exculpatory grand jury 
testimony would rarely be admissible against the government.13  By 
contrast, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia, Sixth, and 
Ninth Circuits have compared the prosecution’s respective motives “at a 
high level of generality”14 and issued decisions suggesting that exculpatory 
grand jury testimony is almost always admissible against the government 
because the prosecution’s “motive” at both proceedings is simply to 
challenge any testimony adverse to its theory of the case.15 
In evidentiary terms, Rule 804(b)(1) balances fairness to litigants with 
the fact-finders’ need for information by admitting prior testimony hearsay 
that meets a certain standard of reliability.16  The rule does not promote a 
general policy favoring either the government or the defendant in criminal 
proceedings; and, this Note argues, courts’ admissibility analyses under the 
rule’s “similar motive” test should not consider the strategic use of 
questioning common to grand jury examinations.17  In each decision 
contributing to the circuit split that is the subject of this Note, the court 
reached its conclusion based on analysis of a common set of factors.18  This 
 
 7. The facts of United States v. DiNapoli, a case against several defendants accused of 
participating in a construction bid-rigging scheme, are illustrative. 8 F.3d 909, 910 (2d Cir. 
1993).  See also infra Part II.A.1. 
 8. See, e.g., DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 910. 
 9. See, e.g., id. at 910–11 (describing the grand jury proceeding of two witnesses who 
testified favorably to the defendants after indictments were returned). 
 10. See, e.g., id. at 911. 
 11. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 937 F.2d 797, 804 (2d Cir. 1991), rev’d, 505 U.S. 
317 (1992). 
 12. See, e.g., DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 911–12; see also FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1). 
 13. See United States v. Omar, 104 F.3d 519, 523 (1st Cir. 1997); DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 
914–15. 
 14. See United States v. McFall, 558 F.3d 951, 962 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 15. See id. at 963; United States v. Foster, 128 F.3d 949, 955–56 (6th Cir. 1997); United 
States v. Miller, 904 F.2d 65, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
 16. See infra Part I.C.1. 
 17. See infra Part III.B; see also infra note 225 and accompanying text. 
 18. See infra Part III.A.3. 
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Note examines the circuit court cases, paying special attention to the factors 
on which the courts based their decisions, and argues that some of those 
factors are beyond the scope of Rule 804(b)(1) and should not be 
considered in the “similar motive” analysis.  This Note then proposes an 
admissibility test for grand jury testimony offered against the government 
that avoids the impermissible factors. 
Part I.A–C examines the development of the prior testimony hearsay 
exception from the common law through its codification in the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, paying special attention to the purposes the rule is meant 
to serve in contemporary evidence law.  Part I.D examines the application 
of Rule 804(b)(1) to grand jury testimony offered against the government.  
This part highlights the difficulty courts face in interpreting the rule’s 
“similar motive” language by showing how its application to the same 
factors—in different contexts—has led to opposing admissibility holdings.  
Part II discusses the principal cases where courts have applied Rule 
804(b)(1)’s “similar motive” test to grand jury testimony offered against the 
government, emphasizing the particular factors that influenced each court’s 
decision.  Part III analyzes the two groups of cases contributing to the 
circuit split, as well as the factors upon which the courts based their 
admissibility decisions, in light of Rule 804(b)(1)’s evidentiary purposes.  
This Part argues that certain factors the courts considered do not affect the 
motive to develop testimony and thus have no legitimate place in the Rule 
804(b)(1) analysis.  Finally, Part III.B proposes an objective “similar 
motive” test designed to meet the evidentiary purposes of Rule 804(b)(1) 
while avoiding the impermissible factors. 
This Note concludes that courts should find “similar motive” and admit 
grand jury testimony against the government only where a reasonable 
prosecutor, proceeding as if the witness were testifying at trial, would have 
had a motive to discredit the witness’s grand jury testimony.  In other 
words, considering the scope of the investigation and the information 
available to the prosecution at the time of questioning, the court should 
admit exculpatory grand jury testimony if a reasonable prosecutor would 
have had a motive to challenge the testimony on the issues now relevant at 
trial, regardless of whether the prosecution failed to raise such a challenge 
for strategic reasons or otherwise. 
I.  THE PRIOR TESTIMONY HEARSAY EXCEPTION AND GRAND JURY 
PROCEEDINGS 
The hearsay exception for prior testimony has a long history in the 
common law prior to its codification as Federal Rule of Evidence 
804(b)(1).19  Part I.A discusses the general prohibition against hearsay 
evidence and places the exception for prior testimony in context with the 
other hearsay exceptions.  Part I.B explains the historical justification for 
admitting prior testimony and discusses the requirements for admissibility.  
Part I.C discusses the competing evidentiary concerns that are balanced by 
 
 19. See infra Part I.C. 
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the prior testimony hearsay exception and how that balance has shifted from 
the common law to the exception’s codification in the Federal Rules of 
Evidence.  Finally, Part I.D explains the “opportunity” and “similar motive” 
elements of Rule 804(b)(1) and compares the application of the rule to 
grand jury and preliminary hearing testimony.  This comparison highlights 
the manipulability of the rule’s “similar motive” language and lays the 
foundation for Part II’s examination of the circuit split in grand jury 
testimony admissibility decisions. 
A.  The Hearsay Prohibition and Its Exceptions 
The reliability of any witness’s testimony depends on the quality of the 
witness’s perception, memory, and narration, and the degree to which the 
witness testifies with sincerity.20  The American legal system enables 
evaluation of these characteristics of witness testimony by requiring that 
testimony be (1) delivered under oath, (2) delivered in the presence of the 
fact-finder, and (3) subject to examination by its proponent and immediate 
cross-examination by its opponent.21  When a statement is made without the 
benefit of any one of these conditions, its reliability is subject to question 
and it is inadmissible hearsay.22  Hearsay statements that are not covered by 
an exception to the general prohibition are also inadmissible out of concern 
for fairness to litigants.23  The American legal system relies on the principle 
that evidence should not be admitted against a party unless that party has—
or, in the case of prior testimony, has had—a chance to rebut it.24  Because 
most hearsay was not subject to examination by the party against whom it is 
offered at trial, fairness dictates that it should be inadmissible.25  
Formalistic guarantees of reliability and fairness aside, the law of evidence 
generally seeks to admit evidence that is potentially probative, especially 
when exclusion might result in injustice.26  This is especially true when the 
evidence under consideration offers other assurances that it is trustworthy27 
or that it would be fair to admit it against a litigant.28  Hence, there exist 
 
 20. See FED. R. EVID. art. VIII advisory committee’s note. 
 21. See id. 
 22. See Martin, supra note 4, at 550. 
 23. See Glen Weissenberger, The Former Testimony Hearsay Exception:  A Study in 
Rulemaking, Judicial Revisionism, and the Separation of Powers, 67 N.C. L. REV. 295, 301 
(1989). 
 24. See id. 
 25. See id. 
 26. See FED. R. EVID. art. VIII advisory committee’s note (“Common sense tells that 
much evidence which is not given under the three conditions may be inherently superior to 
much that is.  Moreover, when the choice is between evidence which is less than best and no 
evidence at all, only clear folly would dictate an across-the-board policy of doing without.  
The problem thus resolves itself into effecting a sensible accommodation between these 
considerations and the desirability of giving testimony under the ideal conditions.”); 2 
SPENCER A. GARD, JONES ON EVIDENCE:  CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 8:9, at 179 (6th ed. 1972); 
Martin, supra note 4, at 550. 
 27. See Martin, supra note 4, at 550. 
 28. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) advisory committee’s note (explaining that fairness 
concerns are not implicated in the admission of prior testimony that has been sufficiently 
cross-examined by the party opposing it). 
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many exceptions to the general prohibition against the admission of hearsay 
for various classes of evidence;29 and some types of evidence that would 
otherwise be considered hearsay are entirely omitted from the definition.30  
The Federal Rules of Evidence have divided admissible hearsay into two 
broad categories, “one dealing with situations where availability [at trial] of 
the declarant is regarded as immaterial and the other with those where 
unavailability is made a condition to the admission of the hearsay 
statement.”31 
The exceptions codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 803, where 
availability of the declarant is immaterial, admit classes of hearsay with the 
shared characteristic that the circumstances surrounding the statements 
guarantee their trustworthiness sufficiently to overcome concerns about lack 
of oath, personal presence, or immediate cross-examination.32  In other 
words, the hearsay evidence admissible under this rule may be the best 
evidence available, and there is a perceived need for it at trial, so it is 
admissible without regard for whether the declarant could be produced to 
testify on the same subject under the three conditions for reliability.33  The 
exceptions codified in Rule 804, however, govern evidence that is not the 
best that could ideally be obtained.34  Nonetheless, it is admissible because 
(1) the declarant is no longer available and (2) the conditions under which 
the hearsay was obtained generated enough circumstantial guarantees of its 
trustworthiness that its probative value is not outweighed by its lack of 
 
 29. See FED. R. EVID. art. VIII advisory committee’s note (“The solution evolved by the 
common law has been a general rule excluding hearsay but subject to numerous exceptions 
under circumstances supposed to furnish guarantees of trustworthiness.”).  For the types of 
hearsay evidence admissible because they offer other circumstantial guarantees of reliability, 
see FED. R. EVID. 803, 804. 
 30. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d) (“Statements Which Are Not Hearsay”).  One example of a 
type of evidence excluded from the hearsay definition is a statement by a party-opponent that 
is admissible against that party as its own statement, despite its having been made under 
circumstances lacking the guarantees of reliability.  Such a statement is clearly hearsay under 
the definition in FED. R. EVID. 801(a)–(c), but, according to FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2), it is 
excluded from the definition. 
 31. FED. R. EVID. art. VIII advisory committee’s note (referring to FED. R. EVID. 803 
(“Availability of Declarant Immaterial”), 804 (“Declarant Unavailable”)). 
 32. See FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note (“The present rule proceeds upon 
the theory that under appropriate circumstances a hearsay statement may possess 
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness sufficient to justify nonproduction of the 
declarant in person at the trial even though he may be available.”). 
 33. See id.  An example of this type of evidence is the “excited utterance,” which is “[a] 
statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the 
stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.” FED. R. EVID. 803(2).  Hearsay 
statements of this type are admissible on the theory that the circumstances of their utterance 
“may produce a condition of excitement which temporarily stills the capacity of reflection 
and produces utterances free of conscious fabrication.” FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory 
committee’s note.  They are spontaneous and therefore do not implicate the testimonial 
capacities of perception, memory, narration, and sincerity to the same degree as non-
spontaneous types of hearsay.  The reliability of these statements would thus not be 
improved by delivery under the conditions of oath, personal presence, or immediate cross-
examination. See id. 
 34. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b) advisory committee’s note. 
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conformity with the three conditions for reliability.35  According to the 
advisory committee, “[Rule 804] expresses preferences:  testimony given 
on the stand in person is preferred over hearsay, and hearsay, if of the 
specified quality, is preferred over complete loss of the evidence of the 
declarant.”36  Prior testimony is among the types of hearsay classified under 
Rule 804.37 
B.  The Admissibility of Prior Testimony Hearsay 
Prior testimony hearsay is a second-best type of evidence that would not 
be admissible if the witness were available to testify in person.38  Of the 
three guarantees of testimonial reliability, prior testimony hearsay only 
lacks the second:  it was not delivered in open court in the presence of the 
fact-finder and the adversary.39  The declarant was under oath at the prior 
proceeding, however, and was subject to immediate cross-examination or 
its equivalent.40  Historically, delivering testimony in the personal presence 
 
 35. See, e.g., Glen Weissenberger, Federal Rule of Evidence 804:  Admissible Hearsay 
from an Unavailable Declarant, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 1079, 1106–07 (1987).  Explaining the 
rationale behind Rule 804(b)(2)’s admission of “dying declarations,” Professor 
Weissenberger states: 
The exception for deathbed statements . . . originally derived its assumed 
guarantee of trustworthiness from the religious belief that a dying person would 
not meet his maker with a lie on his lips.  In the more secular world, however, this 
rationale for the exception has largely been supplanted by the theory that the 
powerful psychological forces bearing on the declarant at the moment of death 
engender a compulsion to speak truthfully. 
Id. (footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted).  There is thus no need for such 
testimony to have been delivered under oath, in the personal presence of the fact-finder, and 
subject to immediate cross-examination.  If the deathbed declarant were still “available” to 
testify, however, the declarant’s live testimony on the same matter would be preferred. See 
FED. R. EVID. 804(b) advisory committee’s note; see also Jack R. Jelsema et al., Comment, 
Hearsay Under the Proposed Federal Rules:  A Discretionary Approach, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 
1077, 1102 (1969) (“The theory underlying the . . . category of exceptions, which requires 
the declarant to be unavailable as a witness, is that although it would be preferable to have 
the declarant testify as a witness, if he is unavailable there is sufficient circumstantial 
assurance of accuracy so that it is better to receive the statement in evidence than to do 
completely without it.”). 
 36. FED. R. EVID. 804(b) advisory committee’s note. 
 37. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1). 
 38. United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394–95 (1986) (“[F]ormer testimony often is 
only a weaker substitute for live testimony.  It seldom has independent evidentiary 
significance of its own, but is intended to replace live testimony.  If the declarant is available 
and the same information can be presented to the trier of fact in the form of live testimony, 
with full cross-examination and the opportunity to view the demeanor of the declarant, there 
is little justification for relying on the weaker version.  When two versions of the same 
evidence are available, longstanding principles of the law of hearsay . . . favor the better 
evidence.  But if the declarant is unavailable, no ‘better’ version of the evidence exists, and 
the former testimony may be admitted as a substitute for live testimony on the same point.” 
(citation omitted)). 
 39. Martin, supra note 4, at 550–51. 
 40. See id.; 2 H. C. UNDERHILL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 420 
(Philip F. Herrick ed., 5th ed. 1973); see also FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) advisory committee’s 
note (explaining that direct and redirect examination of one’s own witness are the equivalent 
of cross-examination for the purposes of the rule).  Whether the questioning that took place 
at the prior proceeding actually satisfies the reliability requirement of cross-examination is 
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of the fact-finder has been important because the demeanor of the witness, 
in addition to the recorded evidence of what the witness says, offers 
“valuable clues” to the fact-finder.41  Also, “the solemnity of the occasion 
and the possibility of public disgrace” created a disincentive for witnesses 
to offer false testimony.42  Today, however, the importance of these 
guarantees of testimonial trustworthiness is eclipsed by cross-examination’s 
role in ensuring reliability.43  Dean John Henry Wigmore has called cross-
examination “the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of 
truth.”44  Given that prior testimony has theoretically been subject to cross-
examination (or to direct or redirect examination)45 by a party with interests 
similar to those of the party against whom it is admitted, it has been argued 
that “former testimony is the strongest hearsay” and that it should be 
admissible regardless of whether the declarant is available.46  Some 
commentators have even argued that prior testimony is not hearsay at all.47  
The drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence did not endorse this position 
but nevertheless accepted the common law understanding that prior 
testimony satisfies the primary evidentiary concerns of fairness and 
reliability and should therefore be admissible under an exception to the 
Rules’ general prohibition against hearsay.48 
 
central to this Note’s discussion.  But, for general purposes, and as distinguished from other 
types of admissible hearsay, prior testimony that is admitted has met the reliability 
requirement of immediate cross-examination. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) advisory committee’s 
note. 
 41. FED. R. EVID. art. VIII advisory committee’s note (citing Universal Camera Corp. v. 
NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 495–96 (1951)). 
 42. Id.  In the case of prior testimony, this last function of impressing the witness with 
solemnity is still met because, even though the witness is not present at trial, the witness 
nonetheless delivered testimony in the course of a formal proceeding. See FED. R. EVID. 
804(b)(1) (admitting prior testimony only when “given as a witness at another hearing . . . or 
in a deposition taken in compliance with law in the course of . . . [a] proceeding”). 
 43. See 2 GARD, supra note 26, § 9:25; Martin, supra note 4, at 553–54 (“Given the faith 
which the Anglo-American adversary system places in the efficacy of cross-examination, it 
is not surprising that the most important feature of the former-testimony exception is that 
which requires such testimony to have been given in a situation where an opportunity existed 
to utilize that truth-testing device.”); Weissenberger, supra note 23, at 301 n.30 (“‘[T]he 
[Anglo-American] belief that no safeguard for testing the value of human statements is 
comparable to that furnished by cross-examination, and the conviction that no statement . . . 
should be used as testimony until it has been probed and sublimated by that test’ forms the 
basis for the norm that probative evidence should be rejected if it cannot be rebutted by the 
adverse party.” (quoting 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 
§ 1367 (Chadbourn rev. 1974))). 
 44. 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1367 (Chadbourn 
rev. 1974). 
 45. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1). 
 46. Id. advisory committee’s note. 
 47. See, e.g., 5 WIGMORE, supra note 44, § 1370; Weissenberger, supra note 23, at 296 
n.6 (listing commentators who disagree whether prior testimony should be characterized as 
hearsay). 
 48. See FED. R. EVID. art. VIII advisory committee’s note (explaining the common law 
basis for the hearsay exceptions codified in the Federal Rules of Evidence); 5 WIGMORE, 
supra note 44, § 1422 (explaining that certain hearsay evidence may be accepted untested 
because its trustworthiness is circumstantially guaranteed); Weissenberger, supra note 35, at 
1095 (noting that “[t]he common law exception to the hearsay rule codified in Rule 
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Unavailability of the witness is also an important requirement for 
statements to be admissible under the prior testimony hearsay exception.49  
“Unavailability” includes situations in which the declarant (1) is exempted 
from testifying on the ground of privilege, (2) refuses to testify despite 
being ordered by the court to do so, (3) testifies to a lack of memory 
concerning the prior testimony, (4) is unable to testify because of physical 
or mental illness or death, or (5) is absent and unable to be procured by the 
party seeking to offer the testimony.50  A declarant is not “unavailable” if 
the proponent of the testimony in any way procured the declarant’s 
unavailability.51  Under certain circumstances, as discussed below, a 
witness’s unavailability in criminal cases is due to the witness’s claim of 
the privilege against self-incrimination and the prosecution’s refusal to 
grant immunity.52  The government’s refusal to immunize a witness under 
these circumstances is not considered “procurement” of the witness’s 
unavailability under Rule 804(b)(1).53 
C.  The Development of the Prior Testimony Hearsay Exception from the 
Common Law to Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1) 
The prior testimony hearsay exception balances the competing 
evidentiary concerns of fairness to litigants and the necessity of information 
for fact-finders.54  Although the purpose of the exception has remained 
consistent throughout its history, the balance between these concerns has 
not.55  This section explains that the exception is rooted in a desire to 
promote strict fairness to litigants.  Over time, however, the exception’s 
requirements were relaxed to allow more prior testimony to be admitted; 
when the exception was codified as part of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
the drafters were conscious to write a rule that more evenly balanced 
concerns for fairness with concerns for necessity. 
1.  Fairness, Necessity, and the Adversarial System 
A tension exists in the law of evidence between the desire to provide 
fact-finders with the greatest amount of information available—to increase 
the accuracy of decisions rendered—and the desire to exclude otherwise 
 
804(b)(1) is justified by the traditional policies of necessity and trustworthiness,” and that 
trustworthiness, like adversarial fairness, is a function of cross-examination). 
 49. See United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394–95 (1986). 
 50. FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(1)–(5). 
 51. FED. R. EVID. 804(a). 
 52. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 937 F.2d 797, 804 (2d Cir. 1991), rev’d, 505 U.S. 
317 (1992). 
 53. See, e.g., United States v. Lang, 589 F.2d 92, 95–96 (2d Cir. 1978) (“[T]he law 
appears to be well settled that the power of the Executive Branch to grant immunity to a 
witness is discretionary and no obligation exists on the part of the United States Attorney to 
seek such immunity.”); see also Daniel J. Capra, ‘Salerno,’ Plain Meaning and the Supreme 
Court, N.Y. L.J., July 17, 1992, at 3. 
 54. See infra Part I.C.1. 
 55. See infra Part I.C.2. 
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relevant information when its admission would be unfair to litigants.56  In 
the United States, evidence law generally developed with an emphasis on 
fairness to litigants.57  This development could be expected, given the 
adversarial character of America’s legal system.58  Truth is said to emerge 
from the contest between parties, each advocating strenuously for its own 
cause, with the advocacy of each kept in check by a neutral judge who 
interprets the law and enforces procedural rules to ensure that the contest is 
fair.59  The hearsay exception admitting prior testimony, as part of this 
larger body of evidence law, also developed with an early emphasis on 
fairness to litigants.60 
2.  Prior Testimony Hearsay at Common Law 
The admissibility inquiry for prior testimony at common law was 
concerned with “whether the examination of the witness at the prior 
proceeding was substantially similar to that which would have occurred at 
the current proceeding if the witness had testified.”61  No prior testimony 
would be admitted against a party unless the development of that testimony 
at the previous proceeding could be fairly attributed to the party opposing 
it.62  To determine whether this standard had been met, common law courts 
examined the “identity of parties” and the “identity of issues” at the two 
proceedings.63 
Initially, prior testimony was not admissible unless the parties and issues 
were exactly the same at both proceedings.64  This early approach 
guaranteed a high degree of fairness to litigants,65 but it often proved too 
 
 56. See Lloyd v. Am. Exp. Lines, Inc., 580 F.2d 1179, 1185 (3d Cir. 1978) (“[FED. R. 
EVID. 804(b)] was originally designed by the Advisory Committee . . . to strike a proper 
balance between the recognized risk of introducing testimony of one not physically present 
on a witness stand and the equally recognized risk of denying to the fact-finder important 
relevant evidence.”); Weissenberger, supra note 23, at 297–98 (discussing “fairness” versus 
“accuracy” in the context of different policy approaches to the admission of evidence and 
explaining the connection between availability of information to fact-finders and their ability 
to render decisions). 
 57. See Weissenberger, supra note 23, at 302. 
 58. See id. at 297 n.13. 
 59. See id.  By contrast, in civil law countries that use an inquisitorial system, truth can 
be said to emerge from an authority’s independent investigation into the facts of the case, 
and accuracy—rather than fairness—is a more pressing concern of evidentiary law. See id. at 
nn.12–13, 300–03. 
 60. See id. at 302 (noting that “the earliest evidentiary rules developed in response to 
concerns for adversarial fairness” and also citing United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394–
95 (1986)). 
 61. Weissenberger, supra note 35, at 1099. 
 62. See FRANCIS BULLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW RELATIVE TO TRIALS AT NISI 
PRIUS 239 (New York, I. Riley & Co. 1806) (“[I]t is against natural justice that a man should 
be concluded by proofs in a cause to which he was not a party.”); 5 WIGMORE, supra note 
44, § 1386; Weissenberger, supra note 23, at 307–08. 
 63. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) advisory committee’s note; Weissenberger, supra note 35, at 
1099. 
 64. Weissenberger, supra note 23, at 306–07. 
 65. The “mutuality” requirement respecting both parties, for instance, ensured that no 
party could benefit by offering testimony against the other which could not also be offered 
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restrictive for fact-finders because it excluded a great deal of evidence that 
became inadmissible as a result of the declarants’ unavailability.66  To 
address this “necessity” concern and allow a greater balance of prior 
testimony to be admitted, common law courts developed qualifications to 
the same-parties requirement and less restrictive standards concerning the 
similarity of issues.67 
The first qualification loosened the identity of parties requirement to 
allow prior testimony to be admitted against the party that developed it, 
regardless of the identity of the other party at the two proceedings.68  The 
requirement was then further relaxed to admit testimony against a party that 
was developed not by that party, but by its predecessor.69  Courts engrafted 
privity requirements from property law onto the “identity of parties” inquiry 
and required privity in “blood, law, or estate”70 to ensure some basis for 
binding a party to testimony it did not itself develop.71 
Over time, common law courts also shifted to demand not precise but 
merely “substantial” “identity of issues” between prior and subsequent 
proceedings.72  As one leading treatise explains, insistence upon the issues 
being precisely identical is more fitting if the question is one of estoppel or 
res judicata—in other words, of the fairness of binding a party.73  But where 
necessity concerns take precedence, and “the question is not of binding 
anyone but merely of salvaging the testimony,” insistence upon precise 
identity of issues is out of place.74 
 
against itself. 5 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL 
EVIDENCE § 804.04[5], at 804-47 (1997). 
 66. See 5 WIGMORE, supra note 44, §§ 1420–21 (explaining, generally, the relationship 
between the principle of “necessity” and the admissibility of hearsay evidence); Martin, 
supra note 4, at 555. 
 67. See Martin, supra note 4, at 555; see also 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 304, at 354 
(“The requirement has become, not a mechanical one of identity or even of substantial 
identity of issues, but rather that the issues in the first proceeding, and hence the purpose for 
which the testimony was offered, must have been such as to produce an adequate motive for 
testing on cross-examination the credibility of the testimony.”). 
 68. Weissenberger, supra note 23, at 307.  This relaxation of the original requirement 
that both parties be the same at both proceedings was justified on the simple theory that “it 
appeared fair to estop . . . a party from objecting to evidence developed by that party.” Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Martin, supra note 4, at 555. 
 71. See Weissenberger, supra note 23, at 308.  This expansion was justified on the 
theory that “[i]t did not appear unfair to hold a party responsible for a previous litigant’s 
examination or cross-examination of a witness when the party against whom the prior 
testimony was offered had succeeded to the position of the predecessor litigant conducting 
the examination or cross-examination in the prior action,” and, as the party’s successor, 
“stood in the place of the predecessor and succeeded to all of the benefits and liabilities of 
that interest.” Id. 
 72. See 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 304, at 353 (citing several cases); 3 CHARLES E. 
TORCIA, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 650, at 375–76 (13th ed. 1973) (citing several 
cases). 
 73. 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 304, at 353. 
 74. Id.; see also In re White’s Will, 141 N.E.2d 416, 418 (N.Y. 1957) (admitting prior 
testimony concerning capacity to manage affairs in a later proceeding concerning 
competency to make a will). 
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In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the focus of evidence law, as 
reflected in evidentiary rules, shifted from ensuring fairness to litigants to 
encouraging accuracy of information.75  The formalistic “identity of 
parties” inquiry—engrafted with property-law concepts of privity—was 
criticized, and it was recognized that prior testimony could meet fairness 
requirements and provide necessary information to fact-finders without 
adhering to the restrictive “identity of parties” test.76  Dean Wigmore 
ensured that courts would eventually adopt a more liberal version of the 
rule when he famously explained how a concern with the parties’ 
“interests” could justify a departure from strict privity requirements.77  In 
1899, he wrote: 
[A]ll that is essential is that the present opponent should have had a fair 
opportunity of cross-examination; consequently, a change of parties 
which does not effect such a loss does not prevent the use of the 
testimony . . . and the principle also admits the testimony where the 
parties, though not the same, are so privy in interest . . . that the same 
motive and need for cross-examination existed.78 
Rather than rely on a privity relationship between parties, Dean Wigmore 
recognized the importance of inquiring into each party’s “interest” in 
developing prior testimony through cross-examination as the key to 
ensuring testimonial reliability and adversarial fairness.79  Thus, Dean 
Wigmore articulated the general shift in evidence law from fairness to 
necessity and refocused attention from the identity of parties and issues to 
the underlying “motive” for developing testimony, which encompasses 
both.80  Since then, according to McCormick’s treatise, the inquiry has 
 
 75. See Weissenberger, supra note 23, at 309; see also supra note 56 and accompanying 
text. 
 76. See Martin, supra note 4, at 555–56; Weissenberger, supra note 23, at 309–10.  
Employing a hypothetical where two parties individually sue an airline after an accident that 
injured them both, Professor Judson F. Falknor demonstrates how a fairness argument based 
on concern for privity of relationship between the parties would exclude one party from 
using otherwise relevant testimony developed in the other’s trial. See Judson F. Falknor, 
Former Testimony and the Uniform Rules:  A Comment, 38 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 651, 654–55 
(1963).  But, Professor Falknor argues, if the concern was not with privity but strictly with 
the “interest and motive” that the two parties might individually have had to examine the 
witness, then the “social interest in achieving a just and correct result” would favor a rule 
that admits the testimony because the two parties, from the perspective of the testimony 
itself, had the same “interest and motive” to develop it. See id. at 655. 
 77. See Martin, supra note 4, at 556; Weissenberger, supra note 23, at 309–10. 
 78. 1 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 163a, at 278–79 (John 
Henry Wigmore rev., 16th ed., Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1899) (emphasis added). 
 79. See Martin, supra note 4, at 555–56. 
 80. See id. at 556 (“While old ways died hard, the courts gradually progressed away 
from the requirement of literal identity of parties and issues toward a consideration of the 
reliability of the testimony in light of the circumstances.  Accordingly, increasing attention 
was given to two related issues:  (1) Whether the opponent’s interest was represented in the 
first hearing, rather than whether there was identity of parties or privies on both sides, and 
(2) whether the issues in the two hearings were similar to the extent that the opponent in the 
first examination had a motive and interest to develop the testimony similar to those which 
the present opponent would have if he were cross-examining.” (footnotes omitted)); see also 
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) advisory committee’s note (explaining the connection between 
1226 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
become whether “the issues in the first proceeding, and hence the purpose 
for which the testimony was offered, [were] such as to produce an adequate 
motive for testing on cross-examination the credibility of the testimony.”81 
Notably, the common law admissibility inquiry for prior testimony, while 
concerned with the parties involved in proceedings and the issues 
adjudicated at those proceedings, did not consider the type of proceeding at 
which the prior testimony was developed as part of the inquiry.82  The focus 
was first on the identity of parties and issues and later on the parties’ 
“interests” or “motivations.”83  But the prior proceeding’s type provided 
nothing independently to the admissibility inquiry.84 
3.  The Codification of the Prior Testimony Hearsay Exception 
a.  The Federal Rules of Evidence 
The Federal Rules of Evidence grew out of an effort initiated by U.S. 
Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren, who, in 1965, appointed an 
advisory committee to draft uniform rules of evidence for use in the federal 
courts.85  This committee, composed of judges, practitioners, and 
academics, drew from the common law of evidence as well as the Model 
Code of Evidence (promulgated in 1942) and the Uniform Rules of 
Evidence (promulgated in 1953).86  In 1972, the advisory committee 
delivered its completed rules to the Supreme Court, which transmitted them 
to the Congress the following year under the Rules Enabling Act.87  The 
Rules would have become effective on July 1, 1973, but for a bill requiring 
Congress to affirmatively approve them.88  Both the House and Senate 
Judiciary Committees scrutinized the proposed rules, and, after many 
amendments, Congress finally enacted them in 1975.89 
In their treatment of hearsay, the Federal Rules of Evidence incorporate 
the liberalizations in admissibility that developed over time at the common 
law.90  When confronting the problem of how to handle hearsay under the 
 
motive and interest to cross-examine at prior and current proceedings and “identity of 
issues”). 
 81. 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 304, at 354. 
 82. See 2 BURR W. JONES, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE:  CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 311 (Spencer 
A. Gard rev., 5th ed. 1958); 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 304, at 354. 
 83. See supra notes 64–81 and accompanying text. 
 84. See 2 JONES, supra note 82, § 311; 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 304, at 354; see 
also Martin, supra note 4, at 552 (“Federal Rule [804(b)(1)] places emphasis on the 
testimony itself, with the nature of the prior hearing being unimportant except to the extent 
that any such prior hearing did not present an opportunity for cross-examination equivalent 
to cross-examination in the present proceeding.”). 
 85. GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 3 (2d ed. 2008). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id.; Weissenberger, supra note 23, at 312. 
 88. Act of Mar. 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9; Weissenberger, supra note 23, 
at 312. 
 89. See Weissenberger, supra note 23, at 295, 312–16. 
 90. See David Robinson, Jr., From Fat Tony and Matty the Horse to the Sad Case of 
A.T.:  Defensive and Offensive Use of Hearsay Evidence in Criminal Cases, 32 HOUS. L. 
REV. 895, 897–99 (1995); see also supra Part I.C.2. 
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Federal Rules, the advisory committee noted the three conditions that 
historically guaranteed the reliability of testimony—oath, presence before 
the fact-finder, and immediate cross-examination—but also recognized: 
Common sense tells that much evidence which is not given under the 
three conditions may be inherently superior to much that is.  Moreover, 
when the choice is between evidence which is less than best and no 
evidence at all, only clear folly would dictate an across-the-board policy 
of doing without.  The problem thus resolves itself into effecting a 
sensible accommodation between these considerations and the desirability 
of giving testimony under the ideal conditions.91 
The advisory committee recognized the fundamental conflict between the 
desire to exclude hearsay out of concern for fairness to litigants and the 
desire to admit all relevant evidence as an aid to accurate decision 
making.92  The common law’s solution to this problem was a general rule 
excluding hearsay, but subject to many exceptions for particular classes of 
hearsay that were deemed especially trustworthy.93  That scheme was 
subject to criticism, and the advisory committee evaluated other systems for 
determining hearsay admissibility before ultimately deciding that the 
Federal Rules would employ a class-exception system similar to the one in 
use at common law.94  Importantly, the advisory committee considered a 
proposal by Judge Jack B. Weinstein, himself a member of the committee, 
that would have done away with the class-exception system and instead left 
the hearsay admissibility determination to the discretion of the trial judge, 
who would weigh the hearsay’s probative force against its possibility of 
prejudice in each case.95  Rejecting that proposal, the committee remarked:  
“For a judge to exclude evidence because he does not believe it has been 
described as ‘altogether atypical, extraordinary.’”96  The fact that the 
advisory committee explicitly rejected judicial discretion when structuring 
the hearsay admissibility rules will be important to consider in the context 
of certain circuit court decisions, discussed in Part II, that reject exculpatory 
grand jury testimony.97 
 
 91. FED. R. EVID. art. VIII advisory committee’s note. 
 92. See id.; see also supra Part I.C.1. 
 93. See FED. R. EVID. art. VIII advisory committee’s note. 
 94. See id.; see also supra Part I.A.  For the class-exception system employed in the 
Federal Rules, see Federal Rule of Evidence 802 and the exceptions specified in Rules 803 
and 804. 
 95. See FED. R. EVID. art. VIII advisory committee’s note (“The Advisory Committee 
has rejected [Judge Jack B. Weinstein’s] approach to hearsay as involving too great a 
measure of judicial discretion, minimizing the predictability of rulings, enhancing the 
difficulties of preparation for trial, adding a further element to the already over-complicated 
congeries of pretrial procedures, and requiring substantially different rules for civil and 
criminal cases.”); see also Jack B. Weinstein, Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IOWA L. REV. 
331, 338 (1961). 
 96. FED. R. EVID. art. VIII advisory committee’s note (quoting James H. Chadbourn, 
Bentham and the Hearsay Rule—A Benthamic View of Rule 63(4)(c) of the Uniform Rules of 
Evidence, 75 HARV. L. REV. 932, 947 (1962)). 
 97. See Randolph N. Jonakait, The Subversion of the Hearsay Rule:  The Residual 
Hearsay Exceptions, Circumstantial Guarantees of Trustworthiness, and Grand Jury 
Testimony, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 431, 435 (1986) (“Under the traditional framework, the 
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b.  Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1) 
The text of the current Rule 804(b)(1) reads: 
 (b) Hearsay Exceptions.  The following are not excluded by the 
hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness: 
(1) Former Testimony.  Testimony given as a witness at another 
hearing of the same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken 
in compliance with law in the course of the same or another 
proceeding, if the party against whom the testimony is now offered, 
or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an 
opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, 
cross, or redirect examination.98 
 This language differs slightly from that originally drafted by the advisory 
committee and sent to Congress for approval.99  The original rule would 
have admitted any “[t]estimony given as a witness [at a hearing or 
deposition] at the instance of or against a party with an opportunity to 
develop the testimony . . . with motive and interest similar to those of the 
party against whom now offered.”100  In other words, the rule as originally 
promulgated by the Supreme Court would have admitted testimony against 
any party in the present proceeding as long as some party at the prior 
proceeding had a motive to develop the testimony similar to the motive of 
the opposing party.101  As such, the rule promulgated by the Supreme Court 
mirrored the trend toward accuracy and admissibility—and away from strict 
fairness to litigants—that had developed over time in the common law.102  
Not appreciating the general trend in evidence law and developments in the 
hearsay exception for prior testimony, however, Congress responded with a 
knee-jerk reaction that preserved liberal developments in terms of the 
“issues” inquiry but favored fairness to litigants with respect to the “parties” 
inquiry.103  While the advisory committee would have admitted any 
 
admission of hearsay is not left to the discretion of the trial court, even if the judge in a 
particular case believes that the hearsay is necessary or reliable.”); id. at 436 n.24 (“The 
Committee’s rejection indicates that the Federal Rules of Evidence were not intended to 
authorize the admission of hearsay whenever the trial judge believed it or determined that the 
probative value of the hearsay outweighed its prejudicial effect.”); see also infra notes 203, 
210–12 and accompanying text. 
 98. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1). 
 99. See Weissenberger, supra note 23, at 312–13 & n.96. 
 100. Rules of Evidence for United States Courts & Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 321 
(1973). 
 101. See Weissenberger, supra note 23, at 299. 
 102. See Robinson, supra note 90, at 904 (“The Advisory Committee drafted Rule 
804(b)(1) in conformity with the Wigmorean view. . . . The House Committee on the 
Judiciary amended the proposed rule to restore the requirement that the party opponent have 
had a prior opportunity to question the witness.  Thus, the House chose an adversarial 
fairness model of litigation over a truth-seeking model, which would have emphasized 
maximum availability of generally reliable, relevant evidence.” (footnotes omitted)); see also 
supra Part I.C.1–2. 
 103. See Robinson, supra note 90, at 904; Weissenberger, supra note 23, at 312–15.  The 
legislative history of the rule reveals that Congress: 
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testimony as long as a party at the previous proceeding had a motive to 
develop it similar to that of the opposing party at the present proceeding,104 
Congress required that the party against whom the evidence was admitted 
be exactly the same in the criminal context and a “successor in interest” in 
the civil context.105  Importantly, however, Rule 804(b)(1)’s language—
both as promulgated by the Supreme Court and as amended by Congress—
ensures that prior testimony is not admitted against a party unless that 
party’s interests were represented when the testimony was developed at the 
previous proceeding.106  Codified as such, the rule reflects liberal necessity 
and accuracy concerns in treating the “issues” requirement,107 and it reflects 
concern for fairness to litigants in its “parties” requirement.108  Absent from 
the rule—both at common law and as enacted by Congress—is any 
consideration of how the type of proceeding at which the prior testimony 
was developed might bear, in the abstract, upon a party’s motive to examine 
the witness.109 
D.  Rule 804(b)(1) and Grand Jury Testimony 
Rule 804(b)(1) asks courts to condition the admissibility of prior 
testimony hearsay on a comparison of the opposing party’s “motive” to 
examine the witness at the previous proceeding with that party’s 
hypothetical “motive” to examine the witness at trial.110  Courts have had 
difficulty applying this test to grand jury testimony.111  Not only did the 
drafters of the rule provide no guidance, but grand jury proceedings have 
 
[C]onsidered that it is generally unfair to impose upon the party against whom the 
hearsay evidence is being offered responsibility for the manner in which the 
witness was previously handled by another party.  The sole exception to this . . . is 
when a party’s predecessor in interest in a civil action or proceeding had an 
opportunity and similar motive to examine the witness.  The Committee amended 
the Rule to reflect these policy determinations. 
H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 15 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075, 7088. 
 104. See Robinson, supra note 90, at 904. 
 105. Id. at 905 & n.71 (“The sole exception in 804(b)(1) to the same party requirement is 
that a predecessor in interest will suffice in a civil action or proceeding.”). 
 106. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) advisory committee’s note (explaining that the crux of 
admissibility has to do with whether the prior testimony was “develop[ed] fully” at the 
previous proceeding); H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 15 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
7075, 7088 (explaining that Rule 804(b)(1), as amended by the House Committee, concerns 
whether the party opposing admission of prior testimony had an opportunity to handle the 
testifying witness at the previous proceeding); Martin, supra note 4, at 552 (“The proposed 
Rules have in effect retained the common-law minimum requirement that the former 
testimony be given at a prior hearing in which cross-examination could have been compelled 
or was in fact effected.”). 
 107. See Robinson, supra note 90, at 897–99; Weissenberger, supra note 23, at 312–16; 
see also supra notes 101–05 and accompanying text. 
 108. See Robinson, supra note 90, at 905 & n.71; Weissenberger, supra note 23, at 313–
14 (explaining that the House revision of Rule 804(b)(1) reflected an intent that litigants in 
civil matters should not be faced with prior testimony developed by any parties but 
themselves or their close privies). 
 109. See supra notes 82–84 and accompanying text. 
 110. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1); see also supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 111. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
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unique characteristics that make determining a prosecutor’s “motive” for 
questioning especially difficult.112  This section compares prosecutorial 
examination of grand jury witnesses with defense examination of 
preliminary hearing witnesses to demonstrate how strategic choices made 
by attorneys in each situation have influenced courts’ “similar motive” 
analyses and led to inconsistent admissibility results.113 
1.  The Admissibility of Grand Jury Testimony Under Rule 804(b)(1) 
Rule 804(b)(1) admits “[t]estimony given as a witness at another hearing 
of the same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance 
with law in the course of the same or another proceeding . . . .”114  Despite a 
lack of guidance from the common law or from the drafters of the Federal 
Rule, it is now clear that this language pertains to grand jury testimony of 
an unavailable witness.115  The admissibility of grand jury testimony 
pursuant to the hearsay exception for prior testimony remains controversial, 
however.116 
 
 112. See infra Part I.D.1–2. 
 113. See infra Part I.D.2.b.i. 
 114. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1). 
 115. See United States v. Omar, 104 F.3d 519, 523 (1st Cir. 1997) (noting that the 
Supreme Court, in United States v. Salerno, 505 U.S. 317, 321 (1992), “all but held that Rule 
804(b)(1) could embrace grand jury testimony”); 2 FRANCIS WHARTON, WHARTON’S 
CRIMINAL EVIDENCE §§ 470–92 (12th ed. 1955) (stating that grand jury testimony is 
admissible under the hearsay exception for prior testimony but failing to discuss the subject 
in any detail); Article, A Comparison and Analysis of the Federal Rules of Evidence and 
New York Evidentiary Law (Rule 804(b)(1):  Former Testimony), 12 TOURO L. REV. 601, 
602 (1996); see also infra Part I.D.2.b. 
 116. See, e.g., 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 304, at 355–56 (explaining that “the 
Circuits appear divided as to whether in typical grand jury situations exculpatory testimony 
meets this [‘similar motive’] requirement of the Rule”); Valerie A. DePalma, Comment, 
United States v. DiNapoli:  Admission of Exculpatory Grand Jury Testimony Against the 
Government Under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1), 61 BROOK. L. REV. 543, 572 & 
nn.163–64 (1995) (listing sources that discuss the admission of grand jury testimony 
pursuant to Rule 804(b)(1), primarily with respect to testimony offered against the 
defendant). 
Although it is beyond the scope of this Note, the primary problem with introducing grand 
jury testimony against a defendant pursuant to Rule 804(b)(1) is that, because the grand jury 
proceeding is ex parte, the defendant would not have had an “opportunity” to develop the 
testimony. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1); Weissenberger, supra note 35, at 1139.  The Federal 
Rules of Evidence aside, admitting grand jury testimony against the defendant is also 
problematic under the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, which assures to the 
accused in criminal prosecutions the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” 
U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also FED. R. EVID. art. VIII advisory committee’s note; 
Weissenberger, supra note 35, at 1139–40. 
After the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Salerno, 505 U.S. 317 (1992), it 
seems clear that Rule 804(b)(1) is the proper vehicle for the admission of grand jury 
testimony against the government. See Omar, 104 F.3d at 523.  The Salerno holding did not, 
however, clarify how the rule’s “similar motive” test should be applied to grand jury 
testimony or, specifically, what factors courts should consider to determine whether a 
prosecutor had a “similar motive” to examine a grand jury witness. Cf. 505 U.S. at 324–25 
(declining to address the issue and remanding to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit for consideration of the meaning of “similar motive”). 
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In a number of cases, courts have admitted grand jury testimony against 
the government under Rule 804(b)(1) without much discussion.117  In other 
cases, courts have held that the prosecution’s objective while examining a 
grand jury witness is not sufficiently similar to its objective for cross-
examining the same witness at trial to justify admitting the grand jury 
testimony.118  Cross-examination is the key to the reliability of prior 
testimony, so the very fact that the prosecution does not cross-examine 
witnesses in grand jury proceedings would seem to suggest that grand jury 
testimony should not be admissible against the government.119  The 
advisory committee addressed this problem in its note to Rule 804(b)(1), 
however, and offered that the solution is “simply to recognize direct and 
redirect examination of one’s own witness as the equivalent of cross-
examining an opponent’s witness.”120  The central problem with admitting 
grand jury testimony against the government stems not from whether 
“cross-examination” was technically conducted at a grand jury proceeding, 
but from Rule 804(b)(1)’s requirement that the party against whom the 
testimony is offered must have had a “similar motive to develop the 
testimony” at the previous proceeding.121  The government’s position in a 
number of cases where the defendant seeks to introduce grand jury 
testimony from an unavailable witness is that the inherent characteristics of 
grand jury proceedings preclude any possibility of finding a “similar 
motive.”122  Courts have had difficulty interpreting this elusive requirement 
of the rule, leading to the split in the circuit courts which is the subject of 
this Note.123 
2.  Rule 804(b)(1)’s “Opportunity and Similar Motive” Requirement 
a.  Opportunity 
As it appears in Rule 804(b)(1), the word “opportunity” refers not to any 
chance that the opponent of prior testimony may have had to examine a 
witness on a particular matter, but only to a “meaningful” chance that 
 
 117. See, e.g., United States v. Foster, 128 F.3d 949, 954–56 (6th Cir. 1997); United 
States v. Miller, 904 F.2d 65, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
 118. See, e.g., Omar, 104 F.3d at 523–24; United States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909, 914–15 
(2d Cir. 1993). 
 119. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) advisory committee’s note (explaining that Rule 
804(b)(1) could seem unfair to apply “[i]f the party against whom [testimony is] now offered 
is the one by whom the testimony was offered previously”); see also Ohio v. Roberts, 448 
U.S. 56, 69–73 (1980) (explaining that cross-examination guarantees the reliability of prior 
testimony), abrogated on other grounds by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 120. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) advisory committee’s note; see also Weissenberger, 
supra note 35, at 1098–99. 
 121. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1); 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 304, at 355. 
 122. See, e.g., Omar, 104 F.3d at 523; United States v. Salerno, 937 F.2d 797, 806 (2d 
Cir. 1991) (“The government argued, and the district court agreed, that the government’s 
motive in developing testimony in front of a grand jury is so different from the motive at 
trial that the rule 804(b)(1) hearsay exception does not apply.”), rev’d, 505 U.S. 317 (1992). 
 123. See 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 304, at 355 (explaining the circuit split and citing 
cases). 
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would have presented itself to a “reasonable attorney.”124  Where it might 
have been physically possible for a party to question a witness on a 
particular matter but, for various reasons, no reasonable attorney would 
have, the “opportunity” element of Rule 804(b)(1) is not satisfied.125  
Nevertheless, a party’s mere failure to question a witness on a relevant issue 
does not necessarily bar admission of the prior testimony.126  There are 
plenty of situations in grand jury and other proceedings where, for strategic 
reasons, examining parties intentionally forgo certain lines of 
questioning.127  In these situations, if the motive to examine the witness on 
a particular issue existed but the examining party simply chose not to 
conduct an examination, it would be unfair for the court to allow that 
decision to bar the testimony’s admissibility if the witness later becomes 
unavailable.128  This concern for adversarial fairness is especially 
significant in criminal cases, where the stakes are high.129 
Often, witnesses testify before the grand jury under a grant of immunity 
from the government.130  The prosecution may well be aware that the 
witness is unlikely to testify at trial unless immunity is extended to the trial 
proceeding;131 yet, the government is under no obligation to grant immunity 
at trial.132  This puts the prosecution in a uniquely powerful position with 
respect to developing—or declining to develop—exculpatory grand jury 
 
 124. See id. § 302, at 345–46 (“[T]he opportunity to cross-examine must have been such 
as to render the cross-examination actually conducted or the decision not to cross-examine 
meaningful in the light of the circumstances prevailing when the former testimony was 
given.”); 5 WIGMORE, supra note 44, § 1371; Martin, supra note 4, at 559 (“It is unfair to 
hold a party to the former examination if no reasonable attorney would be expected to have 
elicited the now-relevant facts . . . .”). 
 125. See, e.g., United States v. Franklin, 235 F. Supp. 338, 341 (D.D.C. 1964) (refusing to 
admit prior testimony where the opposing party could have questioned the witnesses at the 
prior proceeding but had no meaningful reason to do so because the parties were not then 
adverse). 
 126. See 5 WIGMORE, supra note 44, § 1371. 
 127. See, e.g., California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 195–97 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(explaining that defense counsel may wish not to provide the prosecution with “gratis 
discovery” by conducting a full cross-examination at a preliminary hearing); United States v. 
DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909, 913 (2d Cir. 1993) (explaining, inter alia, that when a grand jury 
proceeding is conducted while an investigation is ongoing, the prosecution may wish to keep 
impeachment evidence secret so as not to compromise the investigation). 
 128. See 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 304, at 356 & n.14. 
 129. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 505 U.S. 317, 323–24 (1992) (explaining the 
defendants’ argument that the exculpatory grand jury testimony at issue in the case should be 
admitted against the government to stop the prosecution from using the following tactic:  “If 
a witness inculpates a defendant during the grand jury proceedings, the United States 
immunizes him and calls him at trial; however, if the witness exculpates the defendant . . . 
the United States refuses to immunize him and attempts to exclude the testimony as 
hearsay.”); Weissenberger, supra note 35, at 1105 (noting that “grave consequences flow[] 
from criminal convictions”). 
 130. See, e.g., 24 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 606.07[1] 
(3d ed. 1997) (explaining that “the grand jury is entitled to every person’s testimony,” and 
the prosecution may therefore immunize witnesses to overcome valid claims of the privilege 
against self-incrimination); Capra, supra note 53. 
 131. See supra notes 129–30. 
 132. See Capra, supra note 53; see also supra note 53. 
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testimony.133  If the prosecution realizes that a grand jury witness is 
providing testimony unfavorable to its case, it can cease questioning the 
witness on that matter.134  Later, at trial, after the government refuses to 
grant the witness immunity and the witness becomes “unavailable,” the 
prosecution can then claim that it had no motive to examine the witness on 
the exculpatory matter and hence did not.135  The importance of Rule 
804(b)(1)’s “opportunity” requirement is to prevent the prosecution’s—or 
any examiner’s—strategic decision to limit questioning from influencing 
the admissibility inquiry where a court can determine that a motive to 
question the witness nonetheless existed.136 
b.  Similar Motive 
In 1975, when Congress enacted Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1), 
there was little guidance for how to apply the rule’s “similar motive” 
requirement, even though the language had been present in common law 
commentary since at least 1899.137  According to the advisory committee, 
the requirement was based on the common law’s “identity of issues” 
analysis:  “Since identity of issues is significant only in that it bears on 
motive and interest in developing fully the testimony of the witness, 
expressing the matter in the latter terms is preferable.”138  Treatises at the 
time of the Federal Rules’ enactment did not contain very useful 
descriptions of what made a motive to examine a witness’s testimony 
sufficient to satisfy fairness and reliability requirements necessary for 
admission at a later proceeding.139  The advisory committee itself also 
provided no criteria for interpreting the “similar motive” language of Rule 
804(b)(1).140  This was a useful tactic, in one sense, because the advisory 
committee wished to create an admissibility standard more flexible than the 
formalistic identity of parties and issues inquiry that had developed in the 
 
 133. See United States v. Salerno, 937 F.2d 797, 807 (2d Cir. 1991) (describing the 
government’s powerful position with respect to the defendant in the conduct of grand jury 
proceedings), rev’d, 505 U.S. 317 (1992). 
 134. See supra note 129. 
 135. See supra note 129. 
 136. See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 2, ¶ 17.02[02], at 17-09 to -10 (“The rule is 
grounded on the assumption that it is fair to make a party who had the opportunity and 
motive to explore testimony at a prior proceeding bear the consequences of a failure to cross-
examine adequately or an election not to do so.” (emphasis added)); Weissenberger, supra 
note 35, at 1097 (“Where the party forgoes cross-examination, it is not unfair to make him or 
her suffer the consequences.”). 
 137. See Martin, supra note 4, at 557; see also supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
 138. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) advisory committee’s note. 
 139. See Martin, supra note 4, at 557–58 (“[A]lthough Wigmore first spoke in terms of 
interest and motive over 70 years ago [as of 1972], even the latest edition of his treatise does 
no more than indicate that in considering the admissibility of former testimony the issues 
must be ‘substantially the same,’ and that property law should be a reference, though not 
controlling, in determining whether the interests of the respective parties are sufficiently the 
same.”). 
 140. Id. at 557. 
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common law.141  For purposes of interpreting how Rule 804(b)(1) should 
apply to grand jury testimony offered against the government, however, the 
advisory committee’s lack of guidance has been problematic.142  As the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit noted in United States v. 
DiNapoli, “the Advisory Committee discussed the offeror of testimony at 
the prior proceeding in terms primarily applicable to trials and did not 
discuss at all the situation where the prior proceeding was a grand jury.”143  
Adding to the difficulty of interpreting how the rule should apply is the 
inconsistent case law governing two relatively similar situations:  first, 
where the government seeks to introduce prior preliminary hearing 
testimony against defendants; and second, where defendants seek to 
introduce prior grand jury testimony against the government.144 
i.  Motive in the Preliminary Hearing and the Grand Jury 
Many cases hold that the defendant’s opportunity and motive to cross-
examine a preliminary hearing witness’s testimony is sufficient to guarantee 
the reliability of that testimony for admission at trial if the witness becomes 
unavailable.145  These decisions tend to focus on the form of the 
preliminary hearing, which allows the defendant to cross-examine the 
witness on the same issues that will be raised at trial.146  Compared with 
trial proceedings, however, preliminary hearings present an inherently 
limited vehicle for the defendant to cross-examine inculpatory testimony.147  
 
 141. See id. (“Undoubtedly, the Advisory Committee was concerned that it should not 
bind trial court discretion by inelastic standards.”); see also supra Part I.C.2.  Note that even 
though the advisory committee did not want to bind judicial discretion with respect to the 
meaning of “similar motive,” this is not the same thing as inviting the kind of broad judicial 
discretion championed by Judge Weinstein, who advocated for courts to determine 
admissibility based on case-by-case analysis of the hearsay’s probative versus prejudicial 
value. See supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text. 
 142. See, e.g., United States v. Omar, 104 F.3d 519, 523 (1st Cir. 1997) (noting 
“confusion on this issue [the application of Rule 804(b)(1) to grand jury testimony] in the 
circuits”). 
 143. 8 F.3d 909, 913 n.4 (2d Cir. 1993) (en banc). 
 144. See 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 304, at 354–55; see also Capra, supra note 53, 
Michael Martin, Grand Jury Testimony Against the Government, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 13, 1991, 
at 3. 
 145. See 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 304, at 354–55 (citing several supporting cases). 
 146. See Martin, supra note 144 (“The focus of the decisions is on the preliminary 
hearing’s form, in which the accused nominally has an opportunity to cross-examine about 
the same factual issues as are raised at trial.”).  Grand jury proceedings, by comparison, are 
not adversarial. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 937 F.2d 797, 807 (2d Cir. 1991), rev’d, 
505 U.S. 317 (1992); see also infra note 218. 
 147. E.g., California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 197 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(“Cross-examination at the [preliminary] hearing pales beside that which takes place at trial.  
This is so for a number of reasons.  First . . . the objective of the hearing is to establish the 
presence or absence of probable cause, not guilt or innocence proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt; thus, if evidence suffices to establish probable cause, defense counsel has little reason 
at the preliminary hearing to show that it does not conclusively establish guilt . . . . Second, 
neither defense nor prosecution is eager before trial to disclose its case by extensive 
examination at the preliminary hearing; thorough questioning of a prosecution witness by 
defense counsel may easily amount to a grant of gratis discovery to the State.  Third, the 
schedules of neither court nor counsel can easily accommodate lengthy preliminary hearings.  
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The purpose of the preliminary hearing is to allow a magistrate judge to 
determine whether there is probable cause at the time of the hearing “to 
believe an offense has been committed and the defendant committed it.”148  
If the prosecution meets this burden, the magistrate judge requires the 
defendant to appear for further proceedings.149  The preliminary hearing is 
adversarial, but the lower burden of proof that the prosecution must meet 
(probable cause as opposed to “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” at trial) 
often makes it “a foregone conclusion that the defendant will lose.”150  As a 
result, defendants often choose to forgo aggressive or complete cross-
examination so as to limit the prosecution’s ability to preview the defense 
strategy or ascertain useful information, such as the defense’s impeachment 
evidence.151  In some cases, the preliminary hearing takes place early in the 
course of an investigation and the defendant may not yet have developed 
sufficient evidence with which to impeach the witness.152  In other cases, 
the magistrate judge may limit the scope of the defense’s cross-examination 
to the issue of probable cause, narrowing the range of issues that can be 
examined.153  Although these factors taken together might suggest that a 
defendant’s motive to examine a witness at a preliminary hearing is not 
comparable with the motive at trial—or that a defendant is justified in 
taking the strategic decision to limit cross-examination of a preliminary 
hearing witness—courts have typically not allowed such considerations to 
bar admission of preliminary hearing testimony where the similarity of the 
issues alone suggested an opportunity to cross-examine.154 
Grand juries serve the dual function of protecting citizens from 
unfounded prosecution by the government and of ensuring that probable 
cause exists to show that a crime has been committed.155  Indictment by a 
 
Fourth, even were the judge and lawyers not concerned that the proceedings be brief, the 
defense and prosecution have generally had inadequate time before the hearing to prepare for 
extensive examination.  Finally, though counsel were to engage in extensive questioning, a 
part of its force would never reach the trial factfinder, who would know the examination 
only second hand.”). 
 148. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1(e); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
§ 14.1(a), at 714 (4th ed. 2004); 24 MOORE ET AL., supra note 130, § 605.1.03, at 605.1-5. 
 149. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1(e); 24 MOORE ET AL., supra note 130, § 605.1.13, at 605.1-11. 
 150. Capra, supra note 53; see also Green, 399 U.S. at 197 (Brennan, J., dissenting); 
LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 148, § 1.3(p), at 20–21. 
 151. See Green, 399 U.S. at 197 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also supra note 147. 
 152. See Martin, supra note 144. 
 153. 24 MOORE ET AL., supra note 130, § 605.1.11, at 605.1-10. 
 154. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 148, § 14.1(d), at 719 (“The preliminary hearing 
presents substantially the same issues as the trial . . . . Accordingly, the critical question [for 
courts determining the admissibility of preliminary hearing testimony against the defendant] 
becomes whether the opportunity for cross-examination was sufficient, which does not 
require that it have been equal to the cross-examination opportunity at trial.  Ordinarily, the 
opportunity is deemed adequate unless the magistrate imposed some significant restriction 
on the preliminary hearing cross-examination. . . . However, courts have suggested that 
insufficiency may be established by showing that defense counsel at the preliminary hearing 
lacked crucial information that would have altered the entire character of the cross-
examination.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Capra, supra note 53; Martin, supra 
note 144. 
 155. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974). 
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grand jury is constitutionally required before any person can be prosecuted 
by the federal government for a felony.156  As investigatory bodies, grand 
juries have historically had wide latitude to inquire into possible criminal 
activity and even to seek assurance that a crime is not being committed.157  
Although grand juries traditionally had a measure of independence from 
other governmental bodies, today the expansive investigatory power of the 
federal grand jury reposes in the executive branch—specifically, the 
Department of Justice—which initiates and prepares all cases that come 
before any federal grand jury.158  In practical terms, this means that the 
prosecutor has an exceptional amount of power in the grand jury 
proceeding.159  There are several reasons for this.  First, grand jury 
proceedings are ex parte, are conducted in secret, and are not presided over 
by a judge.160  Second, the prosecutor has discretion to determine the course 
of the grand jury investigation, including which witnesses will be called and 
the order in which they will appear.161  Third, grand juries may require the 
production of witness testimony through the use of subpoenas,162 and the 
prosecutor may overcome a witness’s invocation of the privilege against 
self-incrimination by granting the witness immunity from prosecution and 
thus compelling the witness to testify under threat of contempt.163  Fourth, 
grand jury proceedings are generally not restrained by the procedural and 
evidentiary rules governing criminal trials.164  Finally, commentators have 
noted the “psychological pressure” that the “star chamber setting” of grand 
jury interrogation imposes on witnesses, which increases the prosecution’s 
power to overcome witness resistance and obtain information.165  The 
otherwise broad investigatory powers of the grand jury are limited, 
 
 156. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury . . . .”); 24 
MOORE ET AL., supra note 130, § 606.02[1], at 606-11 to -13. 
 157. See Calandra, 414 U.S. at 343; 24 MOORE ET AL., supra note 130, § 606.02[1], at 
606-11 (citing United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 297 (1991)). 
 158. See 24 MOORE ET AL., supra note 130, § 606.02[1], at 606-13 (“[I]n modern times 
the grand jury has lost much of its independent force.  Composed of laypersons functioning 
in a part-time capacity, the grand jury is no longer capable of taking the initiative in the 
complex matters that often arise in federal criminal litigation.”). 
 159. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 148, § 8.2(c), at 410 (“Today, the critics [of grand 
jury practice] argue, the sweeping powers of the grand jury are exercised in reality by the 
prosecutor alone.”); 24 MOORE ET AL., supra note 130, § 606.02[1], at 606-13 to -14 
(explaining the relative power of the prosecutor in the grand jury scheme). 
 160. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 343–44. 
 161. Id. at 343; LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 148, § 8.2(c), at 410. 
 162. See 24 MOORE ET AL., supra note 130, § 606.02[1], at 606-13 to -14, § 606.07[1], at 
606-110 (“In general, the grand jury is entitled to every person’s testimony, and anyone 
summoned to appear is required to do so.”). 
 163. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 148, § 8.2(c), at 411; 24 MOORE ET AL., supra note 130, 
§ 606.07[1], at 606-110 to -111. 
 164. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 343. 
 165. See, e.g., LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 148, § 8.3(d), at 413 (“[N]o person stands more 
alone than a witness before a grand jury; in a secret hearing he faces an often hostile 
prosecutor and 23 strangers with no judge present to guard his rights, no lawyer present to 
counsel him and sometimes no indication of why he is being questioned.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
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however, in that the prosecution may not utilize a grand jury for purposes of 
discovery when it is not seeking an indictment.166 
The above characteristics of grand jury proceedings typically provide 
little incentive for prosecutors to conduct aggressive or complete 
examinations of potentially damaging grand jury witnesses.167  Most 
significant is the lower burden (probable cause) that the prosecutor must 
meet to obtain an indictment than is required for a conviction at trial (“proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt”).168  A prosecutor who has met that burden is 
unlikely to expend the resources necessary to fully examine a witness 
whose testimony runs counter to the prosecution’s theory of the case.169  
Similarly, the prosecution will often desire to limit examination of grand 
jury witnesses to conceal information or to maintain the secrecy of an 
ongoing investigation.170  Furthermore, when grand jury questioning takes 
place early in an investigation, the prosecution may not yet possess the 
information necessary to impeach a witness, and the issues examined may 
not be the same as those that are later relevant at trial.171  It should also be 
noted that the prosecution is under no duty to concern itself with 
exculpatory grand jury evidence.172 
Although the circumstances of grand jury proceedings may suggest that 
the government has as little motive to develop exculpatory grand jury 
testimony as the defendant has to challenge inculpatory preliminary hearing 
testimony, courts generally have been more reluctant to admit grand jury 
testimony against the government than to admit preliminary hearing 
testimony against defendants.173  The nonadversarial nature of grand jury 
 
 166. See United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 299 (1991) (“Grand juries are not 
licensed to engage in arbitrary fishing expeditions . . . .”); 24 MOORE ET AL., supra note 130, 
§ 606.05[2][c], at 606-57 to -58 (“It is not permissible for the prosecutor to subpoena and 
question potential trial witnesses to an existing criminal proceeding when the sole or 
dominant purpose of such questioning is to obtain evidence for use in the upcoming trial.  
Simply stated, it is not a legitimate function of the grand jury to serve as a substitute for 
pretrial discovery.” (footnote omitted)). 
 167. See Capra, supra note 53; see also Martin, supra note 144 (arguing that strategic 
concerns diminish a prosecutor’s actual desire to conduct a thorough examination of grand 
jury witnesses, and, therefore, “grand jury testimony probably should not be admissible 
against the government under Rule 804(b)(1) because it almost never has the circumstantial 
assurance of trustworthiness coming from a prosecutor’s motivation to develop it fully”). 
 168. See United States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909, 913 (2d Cir. 1993) (“[B]ecause of the low 
burden of proof at the grand jury stage, even the prosecutor’s status as an ‘opponent’ of the 
testimony does not necessarily create a motive to challenge the testimony that is similar to 
the motive at trial.”); Martin, supra note 144; see also supra notes 150, 155 and 
accompanying text. 
 169. See Martin, supra note 144. 
 170. Capra, supra note 53. 
 171. See id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. See 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 304, at 354–55; see also Martin, supra note 144 
(“[T]he same factors . . . pointed to as calling for exclusion of grand jury testimony offered 
by the defense argue against admitting preliminary hearing testimony offered by the 
prosecution.  If ‘what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander,’ maybe the Salerno 
court’s result is correct, after all.”).  The “Salerno court” admitted grand jury testimony 
against the government on a theory of adversarial fairness alone. See United States v. 
Salerno, 937 F.2d 797, 806 (2d Cir. 1991), rev’d, 505 U.S. 317 (1992). 
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proceedings could be one reason for the differing admissibility 
determinations.174  Policy considerations, such as an interest in supporting 
the investigative activities of law enforcement, may also drive this result.175  
One commentator has suggested what could be another possible 
justification for differing admissibility holdings concerning preliminary 
hearing and grand jury testimony.176  If certain Supreme Court decisions 
upholding the admissibility of preliminary hearing testimony against 
defendants can be said to create a motive for the defense to fully develop 
preliminary hearing testimony,177 then a lack of Supreme Court precedent 
affirming the admission of grand jury testimony against the government178 
might be said to have the opposite effect, providing more support for the 
argument that the government has little motive to fully examine exculpatory 
grand jury witnesses.179 
ii.  Other Motive Considerations 
Courts and commentators have supplied additional content to the 
meaning of Rule 804(b)(1)’s “similar motive” test since its codification in 
the Federal Rules of Evidence.  In his concurring opinion in United States v. 
Salerno, Justice Harold Blackmun argued that “‘similar motive’ does not 
mean ‘identical motive,’” and the admissibility inquiry is therefore 
 
 174. Cf. supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
 175. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 952 F.2d 624, 625 (2d Cir. 1991) (Newman, J., 
dissenting) (“The panel’s ruling [admitting grand jury testimony against the government] 
also creates serious problems for the Government in the development of evidence at the 
grand jury.  If the Government calls to the grand jury witnesses other than those who are 
certain to give testimony helpful to the prosecution (and the Government will frequently 
prefer to call witnesses of this sort, both to investigate undeveloped matters and to freeze a 
hostile or wavering witness’s testimony), it must then accept admission of their hearsay at 
trial if offered by the defense, or severely limit its opportunity to prosecute them by 
conferring use immunity.” (citing United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 853–73 (D.C. Cir. 
1990))); 2 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & MICHAEL M. MARTIN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 
MANUAL 410 (5th ed. 1990) (“[R]uling that the government is deemed to have an adequate 
opportunity to examine witnesses before a grand jury for purposes of Rule 804(b)(1) would 
require that the government treat the grand jury investigation in every case as if it were a 
trial.  This would greatly extend the proceedings and complicate them more than is 
necessary.  Arguably, it would be good policy for the government to call all witnesses before 
grand juries and to develop all testimony fully for the benefit of the defense and the 
prosecution.  But this is not the grand jury system as it now exists for federal 
prosecutions . . . .”). 
 176. See Martin, supra note 4, at 562 n.75. 
 177. See id. (remarking that decisions such as California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165–66 
(1970), and Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407 (1965), “which indicate that there is at least 
no confrontation clause violation when testimony given at a ‘full-fledged’ preliminary 
hearing is offered at trial . . . may by themselves provide a motive and interest in full 
development of the [preliminary hearing] testimony” by the defendant). 
 178. Only United States v. Salerno, 505 U.S. 317, 321 (1992), holds that grand jury 
testimony may be admitted against the government as prior testimony hearsay pursuant to 
Rule 804(b)(1), and it does so by implication. See United States v. Omar, 104 F.3d 519, 523 
(1st Cir. 1997) (noting that, in Salerno, 505 U.S. at 321, “the Supreme Court all but held that 
Rule 804(b)(1) could embrace grand jury testimony”). 
 179. For reasons why the government lacks motive to develop exculpatory grand jury 
testimony, see supra notes 160–72 and accompanying text. 
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inherently “factual,” with its outcome depending on analysis of the specific 
circumstances surrounding the grand jury questioning in each case.180  
Similarly, commentators have argued that the inquiry is concerned 
primarily with comparing a reasonable attorney’s motive to develop facts at 
the previous proceeding with the attorney’s hypothetical motive to develop 
those facts at trial.181  The majority in Salerno confirmed that Rule 
804(b)(1) must be interpreted according to its plain language and not by 
reference to expansive policy considerations.182  In situations where 
information that would have been useful for examining a witness at a prior 
proceeding first surfaces subsequent to that proceeding, this alone is not 
enough to render the prior testimony inadmissible where the existing 
motive for examination was satisfactory in light of the circumstances 
prevailing at the second proceeding.183  Furthermore, Federal Rule of 
Evidence 806 allows for impeachment of prior testimony hearsay in the 
same manner as if the witness were available at trial, so an opposing party 
is not without the ability to bring newly developed evidence to bear on 
discrediting prior testimony.184  Where courts have found that the issues at 
 
 180. See Salerno, 505 U.S. at 326 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“Moreover . . . the similar-
motive inquiry appropriately reflects narrow concerns of ensuring the reliability of evidence 
admitted at trial—not broad policy concerns favoring either the Government in the conduct 
of grand jury proceedings or the defendant in overcoming the refusal of other witnesses to 
testify.”); see also Feaster v. United States, 631 A.2d 400, 404, 406 (D.C. 1993) (admitting 
exculpatory grand jury testimony and explaining that because the prosecution focused its 
inquiry on the defendant’s guilt at both proceedings it did not matter that the prosecutor did 
not assume as “adversarial, inquiring, searching, and explicative” of an approach as the 
prosecution at trial might have wished for (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 181. See Weissenberger, supra note 35, at 1101–02 (“The Rule seeks to achieve fairness 
by imposing factual testimony on a party only where the party . . . had a motive to develop 
or, alternatively, to limit the weight of the testimony at the former proceeding.  Accordingly, 
the similar motive requirement should be read to mean ‘motive to develop facts’ or ‘motive 
to limit the weight to be accorded the prior testimony.’” (footnote omitted)); see also Martin, 
supra note 4, at 558–59 (“Since the opponent’s argument against admission of former 
testimony is that he is deprived of the opportunity to bring out relevant facts, the objective of 
the motive and interest test is to determine whether there is any significant reason why facts 
relevant to the present inquiry . . . would not have been elicited at the prior hearing.  A 
‘significant reason’ for these purposes would be one which would affect the conduct of the 
examination by a reasonable attorney in the same circumstances.  It is unfair to hold a party 
to the former examination if no reasonable attorney would be expected to have elicited the 
now-relevant facts; but if the circumstances were such that those facts could have been 
brought out if they were available, the present opponent can fairly be held.”). 
 182. See Salerno, 505 U.S. at 321 (rejecting the defendants’ argument that Rule 804(b)(1) 
should not be applied in a “slavishly literal fashion” and holding that a court may not admit 
prior testimony under the rule “absent satisfaction of each of the Rule’s elements” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); see also United States v. Salerno, 974 F.2d 231, 238 (2d Cir. 
1992) (“The Supreme Court has made clear in recent years that the Federal Rules of 
Evidence . . . are to be read with regard to their ‘plain meaning.’” (citing Bourjaily v. United 
States, 483 U.S. 171, 178–79 (1987)), vacated en banc sub nom. United States v. DiNapoli, 
8 F.3d 909 (2d Cir. 1993); Capra, supra note 53 (discussing the Supreme Court’s application 
of the plain meaning rule). 
 183. See, e.g., United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1427 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 184. According to Rule 806, “[w]hen a hearsay statement . . . has been admitted in 
evidence, the credibility of the declarant may be attacked, and if attacked may be supported, 
by any evidence which would be admissible for those purposes if declarant had testified as a 
witness.” FED. R. EVID. 806.  See also Capra, supra note 53 (explaining that the Second 
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the two proceedings are sufficiently different, such that “questions on a 
particular subject would have been largely irrelevant at the earlier 
proceeding,” the prior proceeding’s testimony has generally been held 
inadmissible.185 
Ultimately, the “similar motive” inquiry requires that “the issues in the 
first proceeding, and hence the purpose for which the testimony was 
offered, must have been such [that the present opponent had] an adequate 
motive for testing on cross-examination the credibility of the testimony.”186  
The rule ensures fairness to litigants by preventing the imposition of a prior 
proceeding’s factual testimony on a party unless that party “had a motive to 
develop or, alternatively, to limit the weight of the testimony at the former 
proceeding.” 187  The rule is not only concerned with fairness, however; the 
advisory committee’s adoption of Dean Wigmore’s “interests and motives” 
formulation demonstrates that the rule is also meant to serve necessity 
concerns by providing the fact-finder with as much information as possible 
under a less restrictive admissibility framework than common law courts 
employed.188 
The next part of this Note examines recent U.S. Courts of Appeals cases 
where Rule 804(b)(1)’s “similar motive” test was used to admit or deny 
grand jury testimony offered against the government.  The issues detailed 
above concerning the meaning of “similar motive” will be discussed in the 
context of the influence they had on the courts’ decisions, and those 
decisions themselves will be analyzed for the purpose of devising a uniform 
“similar motive” admissibility test for grand jury testimony offered against 
the government. 
II.  CASES APPLYING RULE 804(b)(1)’S “SIMILAR MOTIVE” TEST TO 
GRAND JURY TESTIMONY OFFERED AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT 
A split has developed in the circuit courts over the proper interpretation 
of Rule 804(b)(1)’s “similar motive” language in the context of admitting 
grand jury testimony against the government.189  The Second and First 
Circuits have construed the requirement narrowly and issued decisions 
suggesting that exculpatory grand jury testimony would rarely be 
 
Circuit panel in United States v. Salerno, 937 F.2d 797, 806–08 (2d Cir. 1991), rev’d, 505 
U.S. 317 (1992), admitted prior testimony against the government partly on fairness grounds, 
based on the fact that the government would never have lost the ability to impeach the 
unavailable witness’s testimony under Rule 806). 
 185. See 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 302, at 346 (citing United States v. Wingate, 520 
F.2d 309, 315–16 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that testimony from a hearing on a motion to 
suppress due to involuntariness is not admissible at trial where the innocence of the 
defendant is at issue)); see also Weissenberger, supra note 35, at 1102 (“The critical issue 
raised by Rule 804(b)(1) is whether to admit the evidence or completely sacrifice the 
testimony of the [declarant]; consequently, only genuinely dissimilar motives should result 
in exclusion.”). 
 186. See 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 304, at 354. 
 187. Weissenberger, supra note 35, at 1101–02. 
 188. See supra Part I.C.1–2. 
 189. See 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 304, at 355. 
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admissible against the government.190  The District of Columbia, Sixth, and 
Ninth Circuits, by contrast, have compared the government’s motives “at a 
high level of generality”191 and have issued decisions suggesting that 
exculpatory grand jury testimony is almost always admissible against the 
government.192  This section will analyze the facts of each case, each 
court’s specific interpretation of Rule 804(b)(1), and other factors—such as 
policy considerations and judicial discretion—that led to the divergent 
holdings. 
A.  The Second and First Circuits’ Narrow Admissibility Decisions 
In the two cases that follow, the courts wrestled with how to determine 
whether exculpatory testimony should be admitted against the government 
under Rule 804(b)(1).  Both courts ultimately excluded the testimony, 
reasoning, inter alia, that the nature of the grand jury proceeding itself 
generally precludes a finding of “similar motive.”193 
1.  The Second Circuit:  United States v. DiNapoli 
a.  Facts and Procedural History 
On April 7, 1987, a grand jury sitting in the Southern District of New 
York returned a thirty-five–count third superseding indictment against 
eleven defendants, including Anthony Salerno and Vincent DiNapoli, for 
alleged RICO violations related to mafia activity.194  The trial lasted 
thirteen months and focused primarily on the government’s attempts to 
prove that the defendants were involved in a scheme to rig bids for concrete 
construction work in Manhattan.195  By controlling labor unions and the 
supply of concrete, the Genovese organization was able to ensure that all 
large concrete projects were allocated among a select group of contractors, 
called the “Club,” who then paid a fee to the defendants.196  Pursuant to its 
obligation under Brady v. Maryland,197 the prosecution informed the 
defendants that two witnesses, Pasquale J. Bruno and Frederick DeMatteis, 
had testified before the grand jury under a grant of immunity and provided 
“potentially exculpatory evidence.”198  These two witnesses were principals 
in the Cedar Park Concrete Construction Corporation, alleged to belong to 
 
 190. See United States v. Omar, 104 F.3d 519, 523 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. 
DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909, 914–15 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 191. See United States v. McFall, 558 F.3d 951, 962 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 192. See id. at 963; United States v. Foster, 128 F.3d 949, 955–56 (6th Cir. 1997); United 
States v. Miller, 904 F.2d 65, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
 193. See Omar, 104 F.3d at 523; DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 914–15. 
 194. United States v. Salerno, 937 F.2d 797, 800–01 (2d Cir. 1991) [hereinafter Salerno 
I], rev’d, 505 U.S. 317 (1992). 
 195. Id. at 801–02. 
 196. Id. at 802. 
 197. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that prosecutors violate due process when they fail 
to turn over exculpatory evidence to defendants upon request). 
 198. Salerno I, 937 F.2d at 804. 
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the “Club,” yet the two men testified that no such “Club” existed.199  To 
counter their testimony, the prosecution confronted them with a wiretapped 
conversation—which had been made public at a previous trial—implicating 
the witnesses’ company in the bid-rigging scheme.200  Referring to its grand 
jury examination, the prosecution later claimed that “[w]e did not cross-
examine Bruno and did not tip our cards, and the same thing was true with 
respect to DeMatteis.”201 
Before the grand jury, Bruno and DeMatteis each gave contradictory 
testimony.202  At one point, Bruno was excused from the grand jury room 
and told, upon his return, that the grand jurors strongly doubted the 
truthfulness of his testimony.203  Four days after Bruno testified, his lawyer 
informed the prosecutor that Bruno’s testimony may have been false.204  He 
suggested that Bruno would submit new answers by affidavit if the 
prosecution would agree to furnish the questions in writing, but the 
prosecution declined to do so.205 
At their trial, the defendants subpoenaed Bruno and DeMatteis to testify, 
but the witnesses invoked their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.206  The defendants then requested that the government grant 
the witnesses immunity.207  When the government declined, the defendants 
moved to introduce Bruno and DeMatteis’s grand jury testimony pursuant 
to Rule 804(b)(1).208  To maintain the secrecy of the grand jury transcripts, 
the district judge conferred ex parte with the prosecution regarding the 
defendants’ motion.209  The prosecution explained that it had little motive 
to develop the testimony of witnesses who were known to be lying.210  It 
also argued, in general terms, that prosecutorial motive for investigating 
witnesses in the grand jury is so different from motive at trial that Rule 
804(b)(1) should not apply.211  The district court agreed and denied the 
defendants’ motion.212 
 
 199. Id. at 804, 808. 
 200. United States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909, 911 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 201. United States v. Salerno, 974 F.2d 231, 237 (2d Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Salerno II] 
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted), vacated en banc sub nom. United 
States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 202. See DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 911 n.1. 
 203. Id. at 911. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .”). 
 207. Salerno I, 937 F.2d 797, 804 (2d Cir. 1991), rev’d, 505 U.S. 317 (1992). 
 208. Id. 
 209. Salerno II, 974 F.2d 231, 236 (2d Cir. 1992), vacated en banc sub nom. United 
States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 210. Salerno I, 937 F.2d at 806 (explaining that the prosecution had submitted sealed 
affidavits arguing that it has “little or no incentive to conduct a thorough cross-examination 
of Grand Jury witnesses who appear to be falsifying their testimony” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. (“The government argued, and the district court agreed, that the government’s 
motive in developing testimony in front of a grand jury is so different from the motive at 
trial that the Rule 804(b)(1) hearsay exception does not apply.”). 
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After their conviction, the defendants appealed.213  A panel of the Second 
Circuit held that the district court had improperly denied admission of the 
grand jury testimony.214  Because the witnesses could have been made 
available through a grant of immunity, the court reasoned, Bruno and 
DeMatteis were only “unavailable” to the defendants.215  Therefore, the 
same bar that stops a party from procuring a witness’s unavailability so as 
to admit prior testimony216 should also prohibit the government from 
invoking Rule 804(b)(1)’s “similar motive” test to block the admission of 
prior testimony where the government’s refusal to grant immunity 
effectively kept the witnesses from the courtroom.217  In the court’s 
reasoning, concern for fairness to the defendants and the prevention of 
governmental overreaching counseled in favor of admissibility,218 
regardless of whether the explicit requirements of the “similar motive” test 
were met.219  The court also reasoned that grand jury proceedings are by 
their nature adverse to defendants, so the admission of grand jury testimony 
against the government does not raise the kind of reliability concerns that 
are present when, for instance, grand jury testimony is offered against the 
defendant.220  Finally, the court reasoned that the government had violated 
the spirit of Brady v. Maryland221 by informing the defendants that the 
witnesses had provided testimony favorable to them and then trying to 
exclude that testimony at trial.222 
 
 213. Id. at 803. 
 214. Id. at 808. 
 215. Id. at 806 (“Had Bruno and DeMatteis been, for example, ill or dead at the time of 
trial (and therefore, under rule 804(a)(4), ‘unavailable’ to either side), the district court 
would have properly inquired whether the government had a ‘similar motive’ to examine 
them in the grand jury before allowing their testimony before the grand jury to be admitted 
under rule 804(b)(1), because neither the government nor the defendant would be able to 
examine the witness at trial.  But since these witnesses were available to the government at 
trial through a grant of immunity, the government’s motive in examining the witnesses at the 
grand jury was irrelevant.”). 
 216. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 217. See Salerno I, 937 F.2d at 806–07.  Note that the government is not required to grant 
immunity to a witness who has invoked the privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 807; 
see also Capra, supra note 53. 
 218. See Salerno I, 937 F.2d at 807 (“[W]hen the defendant wishes to introduce the grand 
jury testimony that the government used to obtain his indictment, . . . concerns about 
reliability and accuracy are absent.  Every factor present in the grand jury—the ex parte 
nature of the proceeding, the leading questions by the government, the absence of the 
defendant, the tendency of a witness to favor the government because of the grant of 
immunity, the absence of confrontation—is adverse to the interest of the defendants, not the 
government. . . . Since the witnesses were only unilaterally ‘unavailable’ and could have 
been subjected to cross-examination by the government, we will not countenance the 
exclusion of their grand jury testimony on the ground of purported fairness to the 
government.”); see also infra text accompanying notes 221–22. 
 219. See Salerno I, 937 F.2d at 806 (“While we agree that the government may have had 
no motive before the grand jury to impeach the allegedly false testimony of Bruno and 
DeMatteis, we do not think that is sufficient to exclude the evidence at trial.”). 
 220. Id. at 807; see also supra notes 116, 218. 
 221. 373 U.S. 83 (1963); see also supra note 197. 
 222. Salerno I, 937 F.2d at 807. 
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b.  The Supreme Court Decision in United States v. Salerno 
After the Second Circuit denied the government’s petition for a rehearing 
en banc,223 the government appealed to the Supreme Court, which reversed 
the panel’s decision.224  The Court held that prior testimony is not 
admissible pursuant to Rule 804(b)(1) unless the “similar motive” test is 
satisfied; adversarial fairness alone is not grounds for admitting prior 
testimony under the rule.225  The Court declined to decide whether the 
government had a “similar motive” to question Bruno and DeMatteis before 
the grand jury, however, and remanded for further consideration of the 
government’s “motive” in light of the evidentiary standard prescribed by 
the Court.226 
In his concurrence, Justice Blackmun disagreed with the district court’s 
suggestion that prosecutorial motive to examine witnesses before the grand 
jury is never sufficiently similar to its motive at trial.227  He argued: 
Because “similar motive” does not mean “identical motive,” the similar-
motive inquiry, in my view, is inherently a factual inquiry, depending in 
part on the similarity of the underlying issues and on the context of the 
grand jury questioning.  It cannot be that the prosecution either always or 
never has a similar motive for questioning a particular witness with 
respect to a particular issue before the grand jury as at trial.228 
Furthermore, Justice Blackmun argued, the similar motive inquiry should 
not reflect policy favoring either the government or the defendant; it should 
focus solely on the reliability of the testimony in evidentiary terms.229 
Dissenting, Justice John Paul Stevens argued that the government did 
have a similar motive and opportunity to examine Bruno and DeMatteis 
before the grand jury because the witnesses’ testimony was inconsistent 
with the prosecution’s theory of the case.230  According to Justice Stevens, 
although the government argued lack of motive in the abstract, the 
transcript revealed otherwise.231  By probing the basis of the witnesses’ 
statements regarding the existence of the “Club” and introducing wiretap 
evidence to contradict them, the prosecution demonstrated that it possessed 
 
 223. United States v. Salerno, 952 F.2d 624, 624 (2d Cir. 1991).  Judge Jon O. Newman, 
who would later write the DiNapoli opinion, dissented from the denial. Id.  Among his 
arguments was that the Second Circuit’s holding would frustrate the government’s 
development of grand jury testimony. Id. at 625–26; see also supra note 175. 
 224. United States v. Salerno, 505 U.S. 317, 325 (1992). 
 225. See id. at 321; Article, supra note 115, at 601. 
 226. Salerno, 505 U.S. at 325 (“The Court of Appeals, as noted, erroneously concluded 
that the respondents did not have to demonstrate a similar motive in this case to make use of 
Rule 804(b)(1).  It therefore declined to consider fully the arguments now presented by the 
parties about whether the United States had such a motive.”). 
 227. See id. at 325–26 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 228. Id. at 326. 
 229. See id. 
 230. Id. at 326–29 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[A] party has a motive to cross-examine any 
witness who, in her estimation, is giving false or inaccurate testimony about a fact that is 
material to the legal question at issue in the proceeding.”). 
 231. See id. at 327–28, 331–32. 
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a motive to examine the witnesses’ grand jury testimony on the issues 
relevant at trial.232  Justice Stevens also argued that strategic considerations 
should not influence the “similar motive” inquiry: 
[A] party might decide—for tactical reasons or otherwise—not to engage 
in a rigorous cross-examination, or even in any cross-examination at all.  
In such a case, however, I do not believe that it is accurate to say that the 
party lacked a similar motive to cross-examine the witness; instead, it is 
more accurate to say that the party had a similar motive to cross-examine 
the witness . . . but chose not to act on that motive.”233 
Thus, for Justice Stevens, there is a distinction between the reasons a 
prosecutor might want to limit questioning at the grand jury and the bare 
“motive” the prosecutor would otherwise have to question the witness; and 
the reasons for limiting questioning should not intrude on the “motive” 
analysis.234 
c.  The Second Circuit Panel Decision on Remand 
On remand from the Supreme Court, a panel of the Second Circuit held 
that the prosecution had a similar motive to examine the witnesses before 
the grand jury, and, therefore, the district court should have admitted Bruno 
and DeMatteis’s testimony.235  The court explained that the “similar 
motive” test does not require finding an “identical” motive; it stressed that 
“similar motive” exists where “the issues in the two proceedings [are] 
sufficiently similar to assure that the opposing party had a meaningful 
opportunity to cross-examine when the testimony was first offered.”236  
Despite the government’s argument in the abstract that grand jury 
proceedings do not support finding a “similar motive” to develop testimony, 
the court held that the transcript of the grand jury questioning demonstrated 
a prosecutorial attempt to discredit the witnesses’ testimony within the 
meaning of the “similar motive” test.237  The court also described what may 
be thought of as a two-part test to determine whether a prosecutor 
demonstrates “similar motive” to examine a grand jury witness.238  First, a 
 
 232. See id. at 326–28, 332. 
 233. See id. at 329 (emphasis added and footnote omitted). 
 234. See id. at 329–30 (“[N]either the fact that the prosecutors might decline to cross-
examine a grand jury witness whom they fear will talk to the target of the investigation nor 
the fact that they might choose to undermine the witness’ credibility other than through 
rigorous cross-examination alters the fact that they had an opportunity and similar motive to 
challenge the allegedly false testimony through questioning before the grand jury.  Although 
those might be reasons for declining to take advantage of the opportunity to cross-examine a 
witness, neither undermines the principal motive for engaging in cross-examination, i.e., to 
shake the witness’ allegedly false or misleading testimony.”). But see Capra, supra note 53 
(arguing that Justice John Paul Stevens’s refusal to include strategic concerns in the “similar 
motive” analysis is too “harsh” an application of the rule). 
 235. Salerno II, 974 F.2d 231, 232 (2d Cir. 1992), vacated en banc sub nom. United 
States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 236. See id. at 238 (quoting United States v. Wingate, 520 F.2d 309, 316 (2d Cir. 1975) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 237. See id. at 240–41. 
 238. See id. at 239. 
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court should look to the examination that was “in fact” conducted to 
determine if it is equivalent to the examination the prosecution would wish 
to conduct at trial.239  If the results are inconclusive, the court should 
determine, objectively, whether a “reasonable examiner under the 
circumstances” would have had a similar motive to develop the witness’s 
testimony.240  According to the court, “[t]his latter inquiry ensures that the 
failure to vigorously examine the witness—for tactical reasons or 
otherwise—does not insulate the prior testimony from admission.”241  This 
language suggests that, under the court’s test, a prosecutor’s strategic 
decision to forgo examination on a particular issue might not factor into the 
“similar motive” analysis.242  But, because the panel concluded that the 
grand jury transcript demonstrated a “similar motive,” the panel did not 
clearly apply its “reasonable examiner” test to the facts in this case.243 
d.  The Rehearing en Banc Decision:  United States v. DiNapoli 
Again the government petitioned for a rehearing en banc, and this time it 
was granted.244  The Second Circuit, sitting en banc, vacated the panel’s 
decision and held that Bruno and DeMatteis’s grand jury testimony was not 
admissible.245  The court reasoned that, because the “similar motive” 
inquiry is inherently factual, it is possible for the government to have a 
motive at the grand jury that is equivalent to its motive at trial.246  But, in 
this case, the government’s interest in discrediting the witnesses’ testimony 
was substantially less “intense” than it would have been at trial.247  The 
 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. 
 242. See id. 
 243. See id. at 240–41 (“Nevertheless . . . the court need not turn to abstract notions of 
“motive” if what the examiner actually did in the prior proceeding was “similar” to what the 
examination would be in the current one.”); see also Judith M. Mercier, Student Topic, 
United States v. Salerno:  An Examination of Rule 804(b)(1), 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 323, 336–
40 (1993) (arguing that the panel’s “reasonable examiner” test is the correct one for 
admissibility of grand jury testimony under Rule 804(b)(1) but implying that the panel meant 
to include, rather than exclude, strategic considerations as a factor bearing on “motive”). 
 244. See United States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909, 910 (2d Cir. 1993) (en banc).  Anthony 
Salerno, one of the defendants from the earlier proceedings, died during the pendency of the 
appeal, and the Second Circuit issued its en banc decision under case name United States v. 
DiNapoli. Id. at 911 n.2. 
 245. Id. at 910, 915. 
 246. See id. at 913–14 (“[W]e do not accept the position, urged by the Government upon 
the Supreme Court, that a prosecutor generally will not have the same motive to develop 
testimony in grand jury proceedings as he does at trial.  Though the Supreme Court declined 
to assess that contention . . . we discern in its opinion a reluctance to engraft any general 
exception onto Rule 804(b)(1).” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
Compare this reasoning with the district court’s earlier conclusion that grand jury 
proceedings, by their nature, preclude a finding of “similar motive.” See supra notes 210–12, 
227–28 and accompanying text. 
 247. See DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 914–15 (“[T]he inquiry as to similar motive must be fact 
specific, and the grand jury context will sometimes, but not invariably, present 
circumstances that demonstrate the prosecutor’s lack of a similar motive.  We accept neither 
the Government’s view that the prosecutor’s motives at the grand jury and at trial are almost 
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court explained:  “The test must turn not only on whether the questioner is 
on the same side of the same issue at both proceedings, but also on whether 
the questioner had . . . a substantially similar degree of interest in prevailing 
on that issue.”248  The court read Rule 804(b)(1)’s “similar motive” 
language as requiring nearly equivalent stakes at both proceedings.249 
The court also noted that “[t]he nature of the two proceedings,” including 
“what is at stake and the applicable burden of proof,” as well as the 
examination at the prior proceeding, “both what was undertaken and what 
was available but forgone,” should factor into the analysis.250  Where two 
proceedings are different in their purposes or burden of proof, a party’s 
motives for questioning a witness could differ, even though that party is on 
the same “side” at both proceedings.251  Motive depends upon many things, 
including the stage of the investigation at the time the witness is examined 
and what the prosecution desires to use the witness’s testimony for at that 
stage of its investigation.252 
Applying the above principles to this case, the court concluded that there 
were two overriding reasons why the government lacked a similar motive to 
examine Bruno and DeMatteis before the grand jury:  (1) the defendants 
were already indicted, so the prosecution had no need to undermine 
testimony that exculpated them; and (2) the prosecution had no interest in 
proving the witnesses’ testimony false because the grand jurors themselves 
had informed the prosecution that they did not believe Bruno’s 
testimony.253  The court also noted that the prosecution limited its 
questioning to matters that were already publicly disclosed so as not to 
reveal information that remained secret at that stage of the investigation.254 
Judge George C. Pratt, who wrote the panel’s decision on remand from 
the Supreme Court, dissented.255  He believed that the en banc majority 
erred by rewriting the “similar motive” test into a “same motive” test.256  
The majority’s admissibility requirement, he argued, was stricter than the 
one for which the Federal Rules of Evidence called.257  Judge Pratt also 
criticized the majority for accepting at face value the government’s own 
 
always dissimilar, nor the opposing view, apparently held by the District of Columbia 
Circuit, that the prosecutor’s motives in both proceedings are always similar. . . . The proper 
approach . . . in assessing similarity of motive under Rule 804(b)(1) must consider whether 
the party resisting the offered testimony at a pending proceeding had at a prior proceeding an 
interest of substantially similar intensity to prove (or disprove) the same side of a 
substantially similar issue.”). 
 248. Id. at 912 (emphasis added). 
 249. See id. at 914–15; see also supra note 247. 
 250. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 915. 
 251. See id. at 912–15. 
 252. See id. at 913. 
 253. See id. at 915.  Note that the prosecutor’s belief that questioning was unnecessary 
because the jurors disbelieved the testimony is dubious because “[t]he grand jurors had not 
informed the prosecutor that they found Bruno’s testimony incredible until after Bruno had 
testified.” See DePalma, supra note 116, at 588. 
 254. See DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 915. 
 255. Id. (Pratt, J., dissenting); see also supra Part II.A.1.c. 
 256. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 916 (Pratt, J., dissenting). 
 257. See id. 
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after-the-fact, self-serving arguments about its motive at the grand jury 
proceeding.258  Instead of applying its own test, the court had simply 
accepted the government’s argument that it had no motive to impeach 
Bruno and DeMatteis.259  Finally, Judge Pratt questioned why the 
prosecution was using the grand jury at all if the prosecution was so secure 
in its indictments that it did not need to challenge exculpatory testimony.260 
e.  Summary 
The district court excluded Bruno and DeMatteis’s testimony because it 
agreed with the government that the nature of the grand jury proceeding 
itself provides prosecutors little motive to examine exculpatory 
witnesses.261  It also agreed that, in this case, there was little motive to 
examine the witnesses because the jurors did not credit their testimony.262 
The Second Circuit panel admitted the testimony primarily to promote a 
policy of fairness to the defendants.263  It noted that grand jury proceedings 
inherently favor the government and that Bruno and DeMatteis were not, 
strictly speaking, “unavailable” to the government.264  The prosecution 
would never have lost the opportunity to impeach the testimony had it been 
admitted.265 
The Supreme Court implied that the “similar motive” inquiry is factual, 
so the legal conclusion that the nature of grand jury proceedings precludes a 
finding of similar motive is untenable.266  The Court also ruled that the 
evidentiary terms of the rule must be satisfied; prior testimony cannot be 
admitted based on a policy of correcting an unequal balance of power 
between two parties or of protecting one party from the other.267 
On remand, the Second Circuit panel upheld the admission of Bruno and 
DeMatteis’s testimony because the transcript of their grand jury 
examination demonstrated prosecutorial motive sufficient to meet the 
requirements of Rule 804(b)(1).268  The court described a reasonable 
examiner test for similar motive which, as explained, would ensure that 
 
 258. Id.; see also supra notes 210–11, 253 and accompanying text. 
 259. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 916 (Pratt, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 210–11, 253 and 
accompanying text.  Judge Robert J. Miner, in his dissent, argued that the prosecution had 
actually tried to establish the falsity of the grand jury testimony. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 917 
(Miner, J., dissenting).  He cited the fact that the prosecution had told Bruno that the grand 
jurors disbelieved his testimony as an attempt to impeach it and to provide Bruno with an 
opportunity to correct it. Id. 
 260. Id. at 916 (Pratt, J., dissenting) (noting that it is improper to utilize the grand jury for 
discovery purposes); see also supra note 166 and accompanying text. 
 261. See supra notes 209–12 and accompanying text. 
 262. See supra notes 210–12 and accompanying text. 
 263. See supra notes 215–22 and accompanying text. 
 264. See supra notes 215–20 and accompanying text. 
 265. See supra note 184 and accompanying text. 
 266. See supra notes 225, 227–28, 246 and accompanying text. 
 267. See supra note 225 and accompanying text. 
 268. See supra notes 237, 243 and accompanying text. 
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“tactical” limitations on questioning would not bar admissibility of prior 
testimony.269 
Finally, on rehearing, an en banc majority of the Second Circuit vacated 
the panel’s decision and excluded the testimony.270  It agreed with the 
government that there is no motive to examine exculpatory grand jury 
witnesses (1) whom the jurors themselves disbelieve, and (2) when the 
defendants’ indictments are secure.271  It also reasoned that the lower 
evidentiary burden at the grand jury makes the motive to challenge 
exculpatory testimony less “intense” than it would be at trial, and therefore 
not “similar.”272  The court credited the argument that the prosecution’s 
desire to maintain the secrecy of information diminishes motive.273 
The courts above considered several factors in applying Rule 804(b)(1)’s 
“similar motive” test to Bruno and DeMatteis’s grand jury testimony:  
whether the testimony itself was credible, whether the nature of grand jury 
examinations precludes a finding of “similar motive,” the power balance 
between the prosecution and the defense with respect to obtaining evidence 
in the grand jury, whether a “similar motive” ruling may be made as a 
matter of law, and whether the “similar motive” analysis encompasses 
strategic use of questioning.  These issues reappear in the cases that follow. 
2.  The First Circuit:  United States v. Omar 
In United States v. Omar,274 the defendants appealed from convictions 
for bank larceny, money laundering, and conspiracy.275  The charges 
stemmed from the 1991 staged hijacking of a Brinks armored car, driven by 
one of the defendants, from which the defendants stole approximately 
$900,000.276  The government’s most damning evidence came from the trial 
testimony of Lee Najarian, who lived with a friend of defendant Sohiel 
Omar named Raymond Femino, and who testified that Omar brought a 
large trash bag full of cash to her and Femino’s house on the night of the 
robbery.277  She and Femino had run a trash hauling firm, and she testified 
that some of the stolen money had been deposited into the firm’s account, 
out of which Omar directed her to write checks on his behalf.278 
Najarian first testified before a grand jury in 1993 and, on that occasion, 
denied having any knowledge of the robbery or bank deposits.279  Several 
months later, however, under a grant of immunity, Najarian gave testimony 
similar to that which she delivered at trial.280  At a much earlier grand jury 
 
 269. See supra notes 238–43 and accompanying text. 
 270. See supra notes 244–45 and accompanying text. 
 271. See supra note 253 and accompanying text. 
 272. See supra notes 247–53 and accompanying text. 
 273. See supra note 254 and accompanying text. 
 274. 104 F.3d 519 (1st Cir. 1997). 
 275. Id. at 520. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. at 521. 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. 
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session in 1991, before Najarian’s damning testimony, Femino testified “for 
about 10 to 20 minutes” on various aspects of the case and “briefly but 
flatly denied receiving money from Omar” in any form.281  Femino died in 
1993 and was therefore unavailable to testify at trial.282  To counter 
Najarian’s testimony, the defendants sought to introduce Femino’s 1991 
grand jury testimony under Rule 804(b)(1).283 
The district court excluded Femino’s testimony, and the only question on 
appeal was whether the exclusion was error.284  Case law from the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit had previously held that Rule 
804(b)(1) did not apply to grand jury testimony.285  The court conceded, 
however, that the Supreme Court, in United States v. Salerno, “all but held 
that Rule 804(b)(1) could embrace grand jury testimony.”286  Nonetheless, 
the court agreed with the government’s general argument that “the 
prosecution ordinarily does not in a grand jury proceeding have the kind of 
motive to develop testimony that it would in an ordinary trial or that is 
required to meet the express test and rationale of Rule 804(b)(1).”287  The 
court cited certain factors to support its position.  First, trials are ordinarily 
“last chance” proceedings for both sides;288 in the grand jury, by 
comparison, the government is often only seeking information as part of an 
investigation and neither aims to discredit, nor to vouch for, witnesses.289  
Second, because of the low burden that the government must meet at grand 
jury proceedings and the fact that the government calls its own witnesses 
and can call as many as it likes, discrediting individual grand jury witnesses 
is usually not essential, as it would be at trial.290 
Applying the “similar motive” test to Femino’s grand jury testimony, the 
First Circuit held that it was not admissible.291  Because his examination 
took place so early in the investigation, long before Najarian offered 
testimony that directly contradicted Femino’s, “the government had no 
meaningful opportunity to discredit Femino at the time.”292  Also, because 
other evidence already implicated the defendants at the time, and because 
Femino’s exculpatory statements were a minor part of his overall testimony, 
the government “had no reason to fear that Femino’s terse denials, if he 
 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. at 520. 
 285. Id. at 522–23; see United States v. Donlon, 909 F.2d 650, 653 (1st Cir. 1990). 
 286. Omar, 104 F.3d at 523 (citing United States v. Salerno, 505 U.S. 317, 325 (1992), 
remanding for a determination of whether grand jury testimony meets Rule 804(b)(1)’s 
“similar motive” requirement, implying that grand jury testimony is admissible under the 
rule). 
 287. See id. 
 288. See id. (“If a new trial later becomes necessary and the witness proves unavailable, it 
may be a fair guess that each side has already done at the original trial all that the party 
would do if the declarant were now present for a new trial.”). 
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. at 523–24. 
 292. See id. at 523. 
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were not directly confronted, would lead the grand jury to refuse to 
indict.”293  The court reasoned that, because the indictment was not in 
jeopardy, the government lacked a motive to discredit the exculpatory 
testimony similar to the motive it would have at trial.294  The court also 
stated that the government could have been trying to conceal information 
from Femino at the early stage of the investigation during which he was 
questioned, but the government did not make this argument.295  
Importantly, however, the court, in dicta, stated that, even if the prosecution 
had forgone questioning to preserve secrecy, this strategic withholding of 
information would contribute to a lack of motive to examine.296 
The primary basis for this court’s decision to exclude Femino’s 
testimony was its finding that at the time of his examination, early in the 
investigation, the prosecution did not yet possess sufficient information 
with which to challenge his exculpatory testimony.297  The court also, 
however, linked “motive” to the strategic considerations that influence 
grand jury examination and reasoned that, where it would make strategic 
sense for a prosecutor to forgo examination, the government in such cases 
lacks the motive necessary to meet “the express test and rationale of Rule 
804(b)(1).”298  Under this reasoning, unless the government has actually 
attacked exculpatory grand jury testimony, it would seem easy for a court to 
hold that it lacked the motive to do so.299 
 
 293. See id. at 524. 
 294. See id. 
 295. See id. at 523–24. 
 296. See id. (“[I]t is arguable that the government had no meaningful opportunity to 
discredit Femino at the time.  In any case, it certainly lacked any evident motive to do so.  If 
the government had had Najarian’s cooperation in 1991, it could well have preferred to keep 
it secret from Femino.  The prosecutor might have wished to protect a key witness for the 
time being or to bargain later with Femino, armed with a perjury charge against him.  Given 
the other evidence against the defendants, the government surely had no reason to fear that 
Femino’s terse denials, if he were not directly confronted, would lead the grand jury to 
refuse to indict.” (footnote omitted)). 
 297. Id. at 523; see also supra note 296. 
 298. See Omar, 104 F.3d at 523–24 (“Often, the government neither aims to discredit the 
witness [in the grand jury] nor to vouch for him.  The prosecutor may want to secure a small 
piece of evidence as part of an ongoing investigation or to compel an answer by an unwilling 
witness or to “freeze” the position of an adverse witness.  In particular, discrediting a grand 
jury witness is rarely essential, because the government has a modest burden of proof, selects 
its own witnesses, and can usually call more of them at its leisure.”); see also supra note 
296. 
 299. This is because the government could always argue that it was not sufficiently 
motivated to ask the questions that, under trial conditions, it would have asked; and, the 
court has, by implication, credited this argument. See also United States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 
909, 914 (2d Cir. 1993) (“In virtually all subsequent proceedings, examiners will be able to 
suggest lines of questioning that were not pursued at a prior proceeding.  In almost every 
criminal case, the Government could probably point to some aspect of cross-examination . . . 
that could have been employed . . . at a prior grand jury proceeding.”). 
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B.  The District of Columbia, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits’ Broad Admissibility 
Decisions 
In the three cases that follow, the courts admitted exculpatory grand jury 
testimony against the government, reasoning, inter alia, that the prosecution 
had an adequate motive and opportunity to develop the unavailable 
witness’s testimony at the grand jury.300 
1.  The District of Columbia Circuit:  United States v. Miller 
In United States v. Miller,301 two defendants appealed their convictions 
for charges related to wire fraud.302  They were in the business of providing 
collateral, in the form of certificates of deposit issued by the Commercial 
Bank of Djibouti, to entities seeking large commercial loans.303  The Bank, 
however, was not properly registered under Djibouti’s laws.304  Part of the 
government’s case depended on showing beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the defendants knew the certificates were worthless.305  To do this, the 
prosecution emphasized, for instance, that certificates allegedly worth $17 
million were found on the floor in an unlocked office owned by one of the 
defendants.306  To refute such evidence, the defendants sought to call John 
S. Matarazzo, who was present when the defendants met with a 
representative of the Bank and supposedly received confirmation that the 
certificates were legitimate.307  Matarazzo had testified before the grand 
jury earlier as a defense witness but asserted his privilege against self-
incrimination when called at trial.308  The defendants argued that Matarazzo 
was precluded from asserting his privilege under the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit’s Ellis rule,309 and that his grand jury 
testimony should be admissible under Rule 804(b)(1).310 
 
 300. See United States v. McFall, 558 F.3d 951, 963 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. 
Foster, 128 F.3d 949, 955–56 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v. Miller, 904 F.2d 65, 68 (D.C. 
Cir. 1990). 
 301. 904 F.2d 65 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
 302. Id. at 65. 
 303. Id. at 66. 
 304. Id. 
 305. See id. at 68. 
 306. Id. at 66, 68. 
 307. Id. at 66. 
 308. Id. 
 309. Id. at 66–67; see also Ellis v. United States, 416 F.2d 791, 800 (D.C. Cir. 1969).  
Under the Ellis rule, unique in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
at the time, a witness who knowingly waived his Fifth Amendment rights and testified in 
front of the grand jury was not eligible to later invoke those rights and refuse to testify at 
trial. Ellis, 416 F.2d at 800; see also Miller, 904 F.2d at 67.  In Miller, the defendants argued 
that if Matarazzo had in fact waived his privilege when testifying before the grand jury, then 
it was error to allow him to refuse to testify at trial; or, in the alternative, if Matarazzo had 
not waived his privilege before the grand jury, then it was error to refuse to admit his grand 
jury testimony under Rule 804(b)(1). 904 F.2d at 66–67.  The D.C. Circuit remanded to 
determine whether Matarazzo had knowingly waived his rights but held that either way the 
convictions were reversed. Id. at 67. 
 310. Id. 
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With little discussion, the court held that, barring a determination that 
Matarazzo was required to testify under the Ellis rule, his grand jury 
testimony should have been admitted.311  The court concluded that the 
prosecution had the same motive to question Matarazzo before the grand 
jury as it did at trial.312  This is because, “[b]efore the grand jury and at 
trial, Matarazzo’s testimony was to be directed to the same issue—the guilt 
or innocence of [the defendants].”313 
In discussing whether Matarazzo had knowingly waived his privilege 
before the grand jury as part of its Ellis analysis, the court noted that the 
government, which was the only party in a position to know what transpired 
at the grand jury proceeding, behaved in a self-serving and “somewhat 
disingenuous[]” manner in suggesting that Matarazzo had not waived his 
privilege.314  The court also recognized that the prosecution’s 
“contemptuous objection” to the defendant’s request to introduce 
Matarazzo’s grand jury testimony was “promptly endorsed” by the trial 
court.315  The court’s discussion on these points suggests that part of the 
basis for its holding may have been to right a perceived unfairness 
perpetrated against the defendants when the prosecution’s overzealous 
behavior was endorsed by the trial court.316  But, the court’s primary reason 
for its holding—that, after examining Matarazzo’s grand jury testimony, it 
could “see no reason why the government’s position in the second 
proceeding would differ from the first”—was based not on concern for 
protecting the defendant, but on the fact that the prosecution had a 
demonstrated motive at the grand jury proceeding to attack Matarazzo’s 
testimony.317 
2.  The Sixth Circuit:  United States v. Foster 
In United States v. Foster,318 the defendant appealed from convictions 
related to cocaine possession and intent to distribute.319  He was convicted 
on evidence that was largely circumstantial320—namely, records seized 
from his home indicating that he had made large cash purchases despite 
lacking a substantial source of income, and his presence in the home of 
 
 311. Id. 
 312. Id. at 68. 
 313. Id. 
 314. See id. at 67 (“The government, somewhat disingenuously in its brief to this court, 
claims the prosecutor ‘conceded’ before the district judge that Matarazzo had not waived his 
privilege.  (Since the government was attempting to prevent Matarazzo’s testimony at trial, 
that is an interesting use of the word ‘conceded.’)  In fact, the prosecutor, who presumably 
was in a position to know what occurred, represented to the court below that ‘there was not a 
waiver as such,’ whatever that means.”). 
 315. See id. at 68. 
 316. See id. at 67–68 (noting that the government’s only argument against the admission 
of the grand jury testimony (which was endorsed by the trial court) was an overly formalistic 
argument that the issue was not properly preserved for appeal). 
 317. See id. at 68 & n.3. 
 318. 128 F.3d 949 (6th Cir. 1997). 
 319. Id. at 950. 
 320. Id. at 956. 
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another suspected drug trafficker, Timothy Williams, when Williams’s 
home was searched and large amounts of money and cocaine were found.321  
Before the defendant, Charles H. Foster, was indicted, Williams testified 
before a grand jury under a grant of immunity on three separate 
occasions.322  Each time, Williams claimed that Foster had not been 
involved in selling drugs and that Foster would not have been present in 
Williams’s home had he known about Williams’s narcotics activities.323  
Furthermore, “the government repeatedly made it clear to Williams that it 
believed he was lying and that his testimony could subject him to perjury 
charges.”324  After his indictment, Foster’s attorney requested a copy of 
Williams’s grand jury testimony.325  The government did not provide it and 
told Foster’s attorney only that Williams had “provided false exculpatory 
testimony” about Foster.326 
Approximately three weeks before Foster’s trial was to begin, the district 
court requested copies of Williams’s grand jury testimony.327  After 
guarding them for approximately two weeks, the court ordered the 
government to release the transcripts to Foster’s attorney.328  As soon as he 
received them, Foster’s attorney subpoenaed Williams and learned that an 
Assistant U.S. Attorney allegedly told Williams he would revoke 
Williams’s grant of immunity if Williams agreed to testify for Foster.329  
Once the trial began, Foster’s attorney moved for a continuance, claiming 
that he had not received Williams’s grand jury transcripts in time to 
subpoena Williams.330  The district court determined, however, that 
Foster’s attorney failed to exercise due diligence because he could have 
attempted to subpoena Williams as soon as the government informed him 
that Williams provided “false exculpatory testimony.”331  The district court 
refused to admit the grand jury testimony under Rule 804(b)(1) because it 
found that Williams was not “unavailable” where his absence was caused 
by a lack of diligence in procuring him.332 
On appeal, Foster’s attorney argued that the continuance should have 
been granted because governmental misconduct prevented him from 
subpoenaing Williams.333  He also argued that the grand jury testimony 
should have been admitted under Rule 804(b)(1).334  The U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reasoned that the government had not behaved 
 
 321. Id. at 950–51. 
 322. Id. at 951. 
 323. Id. 
 324. Id. at 954. 
 325. Id. at 951. 
 326. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 327. Id. 
 328. Id. 
 329. Id. at 951–52. 
 330. Id. at 952. 
 331. Id. at 951–52, 955 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 332. Id. at 952. 
 333. Id. 
 334. Id. 
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improperly by failing to turn over the grand jury transcripts sooner,335 but 
that its conduct in “warning” Williams’s attorney that Williams would be 
subject to prosecution if he testified was possibly an attempt to intimidate 
the witness.336  The court reasoned that the district court, however, had 
waited too long to order the government to turn over the transcripts and that 
Foster’s failure to subpoena Williams earlier was therefore not caused by a 
lack of due diligence.337  The court also reasoned that the grand jury 
testimony should have been admitted because the government was able to 
“strenuously” question Williams before the grand jury, and “throughout 
[Williams’s] testimony he continually asserted Foster’s innocence even 
though he was repeatedly warned about the dangers of perjury and the risk 
of losing his immunity.”338 
The court noted that “the two factors which led the Second Circuit to 
reject finding that the prosecutor had a similar motive in DiNapoli are not 
present in this case”:  (1) Foster was indicted after Williams was questioned 
in the grand jury, and (2) there was no indication that the grand jurors as a 
whole did not believe Williams’s testimony.339  Although the court may 
seem to have applied a bright-line rule favoring the admissibility of 
exculpatory grand jury testimony against the government,340 the court’s 
method of analysis—comparing the circumstances of the grand jury 
proceeding in this case with those present in DiNapoli—suggests that it 
applied a presumption in favor of admissibility unless specific factors 
indicate that the testimony should not be admissible.341  The circumstances 
of this case favored such a holding:  the facts indicated both the importance 
of the witness’s testimony—because the indictment had not yet been 
handed down—and the government’s “strenuous” opposition to that 
testimony before the grand jury.342  These are the same characteristics that 
would presumably govern the prosecution’s attitude toward the testimony at 
trial.343  It is also noteworthy that the court expressed disdain for the 
activities of the prosecution and the district court with respect to 
 
 335. Id. at n.2. 
 336. See id. at 954. 
 337. See id. at 955. 
 338. Id. & n.6. 
 339. See id. at 956 n.7; United States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909, 914–15 (2d Cir. 1993); see 
also supra note 253 and accompanying text. 
 340. See, for example, the court’s reading of the holding in Miller:  “Three Circuits have 
suggested and the District of Columbia Circuit has affirmatively ruled that the government 
has the same motive to develop a witness’ testimony during a grand jury proceeding as it 
does at trial.” Foster, 128 F.3d at 955 (citing United States v. Miller, 904 F.2d 65, 68 (D.C. 
Cir. 1990)). 
 341. Those specific factors are the ones present in DiNapoli:  that the grand jurors 
discredited the grand jury testimony, and that the defendant had already been indicted by the 
time the exculpatory grand jury testimony was recorded. Id. at 956 n.7 (citing United States 
v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909, 914–15 (2d Cir. 1993)). 
 342. See id. at 951, 955. 
 343. See, e.g., United States v. Omar, 104 F.3d 519, 523 (1st Cir. 1997) (comparing the 
stakes of trial proceedings with those of grand jury proceedings); see also supra notes 288–
90 and accompanying text. 
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withholding information from the defense.344  It suggests that part of the 
reason for the court’s holding was to right a wrong that it believed had been 
committed against the defendant.345 
3.  The Ninth Circuit:  United States v. McFall 
Monte D. McFall, a California lobbyist, appealed from convictions 
related to extortion, honest services mail fraud, and witness tampering.346  
One of the charges concerned an alleged scheme to extort money from a 
company called Digital Angel that manufactured electronic tracking 
devices.347  California’s Office of Criminal Justice Planning (OCJP) 
awarded a large grant to Digital Angel to fund a pilot project using its 
tracking devices.348  McFall and Neat Allen Sawyer, Chief Deputy Director 
of the OCJP, met with an official for the company and allegedly promised 
that more money would be forthcoming if, and only if, Digital Angel paid a 
$100,000 consulting fee to a company owned by McFall.349 
Sawyer was eventually indicted and pled guilty to one count of honest 
services mail fraud.350  As part of his plea agreement, he agreed to 
cooperate with the government “with respect to its investigations and 
prosecutions of public corruption in the Eastern District of California and 
elsewhere.”351  Prior to his indictment, however, Sawyer appeared before a 
grand jury and testified at length about the events involving Digital 
Angel.352  He called the charge that he and McFall had attempted to extort 
Digital Angel “ridiculous,” and he maintained the same version of the story 
later in his post-plea debriefing.353 
At McFall’s trial, the government declined to call Sawyer as a witness 
despite its authority to do so pursuant to his plea agreement.354  When 
McFall called him as a witness, Sawyer invoked his privilege against self-
incrimination.355  Consequently, McFall sought to introduce Sawyer’s 
grand jury testimony under Rule 804(b)(1).356  The district court excluded 
the testimony, however, citing concerns about unfair prejudice to the 
government and concluding that the prosecution lacked an adequate motive 
to examine Sawyer before the grand jury.357  In support of its conclusion, 
 
 344. See Foster, 128 F.3d at 952 n.2. 
 345. But cf. United States v. Salerno, 505 U.S. 317, 326 (1992) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring) (arguing that the “similar motive” analysis in a given case should not express a 
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 349. See id. at 953, 955. 
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the district court cited several key findings, among them the following:  (1) 
the grand jury proceeding was fact-finding in nature, not adversarial, 
“notwithstanding the fact that the government’s attorneys did in fact 
question Mr. Sawyer”; (2) “the motive for obtaining Mr. Sawyer’s 
testimony . . . was completely different from what it would be” at trial; and 
(3) Sawyer was the subject of a perjury indictment resulting from his 
testimony before the grand jury.358  On appeal, the government argued, 
inter alia, that Sawyer’s grand jury testimony should not have been 
admitted because it was misleading.359 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit began its analysis by 
noting the circuit split concerning the appropriate “level of generality” at 
which to compare grand jury and trial motive for purposes of Rule 
804(b)(1).360  The Miller court used “a high level of generality,” where 
motive to merely show the guilt or innocence of the defendant at both 
proceedings would be sufficient.361  McFall argued that Sawyer’s testimony 
should be admissible under the Miller test because “the government’s 
primary goal in questioning Sawyer before the grand jury was to 
incriminate McFall,” the “same” motive it would have at trial.362  The 
DiNapoli court, in contrast, compared motives at “a fine-grained level of 
particularity” and required “a substantially similar degree of interest in 
prevailing” at both proceedings.363  The Ninth Circuit noted that the 
prosecution’s motive in examining Sawyer before the grand jury was 
“likely not as intense as it would have been at trial,” but that requiring an 
“identical quantum of motivation” violates the plain language of Rule 
804(b)(1).364  Because the prosecution’s “fundamental objective” in 
examining Sawyer before the grand jury was to elicit testimony damaging 
to McFall—the same motive that the prosecution would hypothetically have 
at trial—the court concluded that Rule 804(b)(1)’s “similar motive” test had 
been met, and Sawyer’s testimony should have been admitted.365  The court 
distinguished its facts from those in DiNapoli:  Although McFall had 
already been indicted, the final superseding indictment against him was not 
obtained until after Sawyer was questioned, and, the nature of the relevant 
charge against McFall—conspiracy to extort—provided prosecutors 
questioning Sawyer with ample opportunity to develop testimony 
incriminating McFall, despite the existing indictment.366 
 
 358. Id. at 961–62 (emphasis added). 
 359. See id. at 964 n.11. 
 360. Id. at 962. 
 361. Id. (citing United States v. Miller, 904 F.2d 65, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). 
 362. Id. 
 363. Id. (quoting United States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909, 912 (2d Cir. 1993)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 364. Id. at 963 (“As one of the dissenters in DiNapoli . . . noted, the requirement of 
similar ‘intensity’ of motivation conflicts with the rule’s plain language, which requires 
‘similar’ but not identical motivation.” (citing United States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909, 916 (2d 
Cir. 1993) (Pratt, J., dissenting))); see also supra notes 255–60 and accompanying text. 
 365. McFall, 558 F.3d at 963. 
 366. Id. 
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Finally, the court reasoned on policy grounds that Sawyer’s testimony 
should have been admitted because, due to Sawyer’s plea agreement, he 
was only “unavailable” to McFall.367  The government could have required 
him to testify at any time.368  It also reasoned that the government’s motion 
for a downward sentencing departure at Sawyer’s sentencing hearing, 
implying its endorsement of Sawyer’s post-plea cooperation—including his 
continued denial of McFall’s wrongdoing with respect to Digital Angel—
undercut the government’s contention that Sawyer’s grand jury testimony 
was “unreliable and misleading.”369 
The Ninth Circuit’s holding was based primarily on comparison of the 
prosecution’s examination of Sawyer before the grand jury with the 
examination it would hypothetically wish to conduct at trial.370  The court 
eschewed DiNapoli’s “intensity” inquiry371 and rejected the district court’s 
suggestion that the type of proceeding itself—fact-finding as opposed to 
adversarial—precluded a finding of “similar motive” regardless of the 
questioning that actually took place.372  The court’s discussion of possible 
prosecutorial disingenuousness regarding the truthfulness of Sawyer’s 
testimony, however, suggests that it may itself have judged whether Sawyer 
was telling the truth and desired to check prosecutorial misconduct.373 
III.  ANALYSIS OF DECISIONS AND PROPOSED RESOLUTION 
The cases described above exemplify recent jurisprudence concerning the 
admission of grand jury testimony against the government under Rule 
804(b)(1).  In these cases, courts reached their holdings after analyzing a 
common set of recurring factors.  Some of them are the same factors upon 
which holdings pertaining to the admissibility of preliminary hearing 
testimony against defendants, discussed in Part I.D.2.b.i, are based.  For 
both grand jury and preliminary hearing proceedings, specific 
characteristics of the proceedings themselves deter attorneys from 
examining witnesses in as complete a manner as they would at trial.374  Yet, 
where grand jury examinations are concerned, courts have been willing to 
respect that prosecutors’ strategic decisions to limit questioning should 
count against a finding of “similar motive” and thus bar admission of grand 
jury testimony.375  In contrast, courts have been less likely to view defense 
attorneys’ similar choices to limit questioning as a bar to admitting 
preliminary hearing testimony.  This Note argues that the strategic factors—
which were illustrated in the principal cases above, and upon which the 
difference in admissibility holdings between grand jury and preliminary 
 
 367. Id. at 964. 
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 369. Id. at n.11. 
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 374. See supra Part I.D.2.b.i. 
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hearing testimony is based—should not be considered in the Rule 804(b)(1) 
analysis.  Likewise, neither generalized policy concerns nor favoritism for 
the government or the defendant should affect the Rule 804(b)(1) 
admissibility determination. 
Part III.A discusses the holdings in the principle cases from Part II and 
distills from them a set of factors that the courts considered in their 
admissibility determinations.  This Part analyzes the case holdings and the 
decisive factors in light of the evidentiary purposes of Rule 804(b)(1) and 
divides the factors into two categories—those which should legitimately be 
considered in the “similar motive” analysis and those which should not.  
Part III.B proposes an objective test for “similar motive” at the grand jury 
that is designed to avoid the factors that are beyond the scope of Rule 
804(b)(1). 
A.  Analysis of Circuit Court Decisions 
In evidentiary terms, Rule 804(b)(1) balances the fairness of admitting 
testimony against a party with the necessity of providing as much 
information as possible to the fact-finder.376  Under the liberalized hearsay 
rules embodied in the Federal Rules of Evidence, the common law’s 
formalistic tests for assuring that the opposing party conducted substantially 
the same cross-examination at the prior proceeding that it would conduct at 
trial have given way to more flexible admissibility requirements.377  Rather 
than focus on “identity of parties” and “identity of issues,” the drafters of 
the Federal Rules of Evidence centered the admissibility inquiry on the 
interests of the parties involved, and hence on the “motive” for 
examination.378  In this way, they broadened the meaning of fairness to 
litigants379 and also satisfied necessity concerns by creating a test that 
admits a potentially greater range of prior testimony hearsay than would 
have been admissible at the common law.380  Nonetheless, the purpose of 
the exception remains to admit prior testimony only when the opposing 
party’s “opportunity” to examine the witness at the prior proceeding was 
similar enough to the opportunity it would have at trial to merit holding the 
party to the prior testimony.381  The rule’s “opportunity” element thus 
guards against parties being able to determine what testimony may later be 
admitted against them by strategically limiting prior proceeding 
questioning.382  Given these considerations, it is clear that no bright-line 
test could ever be applied to admit or exclude all grand jury or preliminary 
hearing testimony.383  It is also clear that both the narrow and broad 
 
 376. See supra Part I.C.1. 
 377. See supra Part I.C.2–3. 
 378. See supra Part I.C.3.b. 
 379. The drafters did this by supplanting the common law test—under which similarity of 
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 380. See supra notes 107–08 and accompanying text; see also supra Part I.C.2–3. 
 381. See supra Part I.D.2.a. 
 382. See supra Part I.D.2.a. 
 383. See supra text accompanying note 228. 
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interpretations of Rule 804(b)(1)’s “similar motive” requirement, discussed 
in Part II, fall short of fulfilling the evidentiary purposes of the exception. 
1.  The Narrow Admissibility Decisions 
Although they do not adhere to a bright-line rule, the Second and First 
Circuits utilize a test under which exculpatory grand jury testimony would 
almost never be admissible against the government.384  The Second 
Circuit’s test considers “whether the party resisting the offered testimony at 
a pending proceeding had at a prior proceeding an interest of substantially 
similar intensity to prove (or disprove) the same side of a substantially 
similar issue.”385  The First Circuit, in comparison, expresses concern that 
the very nature of grand jury proceedings provides little incentive for the 
government to examine exculpatory witnesses with a motive “similar” to 
that which would be present under trial conditions; therefore, grand jury 
testimony can almost never satisfy “the express test and rationale of Rule 
804(b)(1).”386  Both of these positions bear an essential flaw. 
By requiring the opposing party to show an interest of comparable 
“intensity” to disprove the witness’s testimony at the prior proceeding, the 
Second Circuit’s test adds a stringency that Rule 804(b)(1)’s plain language 
does not support.387  As Justice Blackmun argued in his United States v. 
Salerno concurrence, “‘similar motive’ does not mean ‘identical 
motive.’”388  By looking for a quantum of motivation that substantially 
matches the quantum present at trial, the Second Circuit effectively 
collapses Rule 804(b)(1)’s test into one that looks for the same motivation.  
The government could always argue that, given whatever circumstances 
prevailed at a particular grand jury proceeding, its motive to examine the 
witness was not as intense as its motive at trial.389  From a pure policy 
perspective, this argument might be difficult to refute because witnesses are 
examined in front of grand juries under a wide array of circumstances, 
many of which provide little incentive for aggressive challenges to 
exculpatory testimony.390  Under the evidentiary rule as it stands, however, 
the test requires “similar,” not the “same,” motivation.391  To read the rule 
looking for the same quantum of motivation at both proceedings harks back 
to the common law’s excessively formalistic requirements that ensured the 
strictest fairness to the opposing party, but at the expense of necessity to 
fact-finders.392  Such a reading of the rule ignores the liberalizing tendency 
 
 384. See United States v. Omar, 104 F.3d 519, 523 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. 
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of the Federal Rules of Evidence.393  Furthermore, with respect to grand 
jury testimony, the “same motive” test is one that could likely only be met 
where the indictment was in doubt such that the prosecution felt compelled 
to actively discredit, rather than sidestep, unexpected exculpatory 
statements.394  Because this is not often the case, requiring the prosecution 
to have had the “same motive” would almost always result in exculpatory 
testimony developed before the grand jury being inadmissible at trial. 
The decision in United States v. Omar395 provides a rich context for 
discussing how strategic concerns bear on “motive.”  In this case, the First 
Circuit ruled against admission of exculpatory grand jury testimony on 
generalized reasoning that the grand jury proceeding itself does not create a 
motive sufficient for prosecutors to examine exculpatory witnesses.396  This 
reasoning ignores that Rule 804(b)(1) was designed to admit prior 
testimony that meets certain guarantees of fairness and reliability without 
regard for the type of proceeding at which the declarant testified.397  The 
internal logic of the rule suggests that the admissibility inquiry in a given 
case should focus on whether the prior testimony has met the “similar 
motive” standard of the rule, not on the pressures common to proceedings 
of a certain type.  By allowing the “similar motive” inquiry to be colored by 
the strategic choices that prosecutors commonly make at grand jury 
proceedings, the court ensured strict fairness to the prosecution, but it failed 
to account for the “necessity” concerns that Rule 804(b)(1) also 
embodies.398  In other words, the court’s reasoning that prosecutors 
conducting grand jury examinations ordinarily do not have the motive 
necessary to meet “the express test and rationale of Rule 804(b)(1)”399 
ignores that Rule 804(b)(1) requires “similar”—not “same”—motive,400 
and that in doing so the rule satisfies the “necessity” concern as well as the 
“fairness” concern. 
The First Circuit also ignored a fundamental principle of the prior 
testimony admissibility inquiry:  a party’s strategic choices during 
questioning should not influence the court’s admissibility determination 
where a meaningful opportunity to develop the testimony was otherwise 
present.401  In effect, the court reasoned that because it makes sense, 
strategically, for prosecutors to forgo lines of questioning at grand jury 
proceedings to preserve the secrecy of information, prosecutors will rarely 
have a motive to attack witness testimony at the grand jury that is “similar” 
to the motive they would have at trial, where they have no secrets to 
preserve.402  This may be true—and, as a result, it might make sense from a 
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policy perspective to exclude all exculpatory grand jury testimony offered 
against the government.403  But, in evidentiary terms, the rule is not 
concerned with generalized policy considerations beyond balancing fairness 
to litigants with the necessity of information for fact-finders.404  Also, the 
rule’s “opportunity” test stands as a reminder that attorneys examining 
witnesses should not be able to control, through their strategic decisions, the 
later admissibility of statements under the hearsay exception for prior 
testimony if the witness becomes unavailable.405 
Neither the common law hearsay exception for prior testimony nor the 
Federal Rule as enacted by Congress emphasized the type of proceeding at 
which the declarant testified.406  As the exception developed, it was 
liberalized to admit more evidence at trial, as long as that evidence met the 
rule’s standard of reliability based on the opportunity for examination.407  
The inherent power that the prosecution has in conducting grand jury 
investigations408 means that when applying Rule 804(b)(1) to grand jury 
testimony offered against the government, courts must be especially 
vigilant to prevent prosecutorial control of the proceeding from influencing 
the later admissibility of the testimony.  Just because a prosecutor 
conducting a grand jury investigation might have the luxury of not 
challenging exculpatory testimony does not mean there was no “motive” to 
do so.409  By taking strategy into account when determining whether a 
prosecutor had adequate motive to examine a grand jury witness, the 
Second and First Circuits have allowed the “similar motive” analysis to 
stray from the narrow evidentiary purposes of the rule and have instituted a 
policy favoring the government’s interests with respect to exculpatory 
grand jury testimony. 
2.  The Broad Admissibility Decisions 
Unlike the Second and First Circuits, the District of Columbia, Sixth, and 
Ninth Circuits have created a presumption of admissibility against the 
government for exculpatory grand jury testimony based on the fact that at 
both proceedings the government is adverse to any testimony exculpating 
the subject of its grand jury investigation.410  The Sixth and Ninth Circuits, 
which had the benefit of comparing their cases with United States v. 
DiNapoli,411 each noted that the particular facts upon which the DiNapoli 
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court relied were not present in their cases.412  Specifically, the final 
indictment had not yet been handed down at the time of questioning, and 
the grand jurors had not taken the unusual step of informing the prosecution 
that they did not believe the witnesses’ exculpatory testimony.413  The 
comparison with DiNapoli’s facts suggests that the Sixth and Ninth Circuits 
employed a presumption of admissibility based upon prosecutorial 
adversity (from Miller414) that could be overcome in circumstances such as 
those present in DiNapoli.  In other words, these courts employed a test 
where grand jury testimony is presumed to be admissible against the 
government unless rather rare circumstances prevailed at the grand jury. 
This rule is inadequate because it does not place enough emphasis on 
whether the prosecution actually had a “similar motive,” in evidentiary 
terms, to examine the testimony of a grand jury witness.  Instead, it focuses 
only on whether the prosecution would have been adverse to the witness’s 
testimony at the time it was delivered.415  Admitting grand jury testimony 
against the government under such a loose standard might go a long way 
toward countering the prosecution’s inherently greater power with respect 
to developing evidence in the grand jury;416 but, as the Supreme Court has 
held, an interpretation of Rule 804(b)(1) that bypasses its evidentiary 
requirements in the interest of evening the odds for the defense violates the 
fundamental character of the Federal Rules of Evidence.417  Subscribing to 
the factual inquiry that the rule calls for, one must concede that, strategic 
concerns aside, there will be times when the prosecution does not have an 
adequate motive to develop some aspect of a grand jury witness’s 
exculpatory testimony, even though the prosecution might meet a minimal 
standard of adversity at the time of the questioning.  So, a line of holdings 
that presumes exculpatory grand jury testimony is admissible against the 
government except under rather rare circumstances, such as those in 
DiNapoli, violates the scheme for admissibility set out in the Federal Rules 
of Evidence.418 
3.  Analysis of Deciding Factors 
The case holdings discussed above, along with the decisions admitting 
preliminary hearing testimony against defendants discussed generally in 
Part I.D.2.b.i, were based on courts’ analyses of a set of factors which 
appeared in some or all of the cases and dissenting opinions.  They are as 
follows: 
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1. Whether, with regard to the specific issue for which the testimony was 
offered at trial, the prosecution or defense had enough information at 
the time the witness was questioned to challenge the testimony.419 
2. Whether the examination conducted by the prosecution or defense 
revealed a motive to challenge the testimony, even if the challenge 
was not as aggressive or as complete as it would have been at trial.420 
3. Whether the prosecution or defense limited questioning on a specific 
issue to maintain the secrecy of information.421 
4. Whether the characteristics inherent in the proceeding at which the 
declarant testified—such as the low probable cause burden or the non-
adversarial nature of the proceeding—acted to limit the questioning of 
witnesses.422 
5. Whether, in a grand jury proceeding, the indictment was secure, or 
whether, in a preliminary hearing proceeding, the defense had a 
reasonable chance of overcoming the prosecution’s burden of 
probable cause.423 
6. Whether the government, the defendant, or the lower court behaved 
disingenuously or overzealously, and whether admitting or excluding 
prior testimony would seem to redress the behavior.424 
7. Whether the declarant was only “unavailable” to the defendant, such 
that admitting the prior testimony would not prejudice the 
government.425 
8. Whether recognizing the government’s inherently more powerful 
position with respect to obtaining evidence in the grand jury 
encourages a policy of admitting grand jury testimony against the 
government.426 
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9. Whether the court believed the prior testimony was truthful.427 
 These factors may be divided into two categories, those that may 
legitimately be considered as part of the “similar motive” analysis given the 
history and evidentiary purposes of Rule 804(b)(1), and those that are 
beyond the scope of the rule and should not affect admissibility decisions.  
Of the factors listed, only the first two are a legitimate subject of the 
“similar motive” inquiry.  They alone adhere to the evidentiary purposes of 
Rule 804(b)(1) and bear on “motive” to examine at a prior proceeding 
without introducing strategy, policy, favoritism, or impermissible judicial 
discretion into the analysis.  Factors (3)–(5) are each relevant to a 
discussion of whether the prosecution, before the grand jury, or the defense, 
in the preliminary hearing, would have felt an incentive to examine its 
witness with the same “intensity” as it might at trial.  But these factors are 
not relevant to whether the bare “motive” to examine, for purposes of the 
hearsay exception, existed.428  Factors (6)–(8) concern issues of policy 
which are beyond the narrow evidentiary scope of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence in general, and Rule 804(b)(1) in particular.  Finally, factor (9), 
which concerns whether the court believes that the prior testimony should 
be admitted or excluded on the basis of its perceived truthfulness,429 
violates the intent of the advisory committee that judicial discretion should 
not play a role in the hearsay admissibility analysis.430 
B.  Proposed Resolution 
As courts and commentators have noted, neither the Federal Rules 
themselves nor the Supreme Court’s opinions definitively state what kind of 
test courts should use in determining whether a “similar motive” exists for 
purposes of Rule 804(b)(1).431  The Rules’ drafters purposely avoided 
boxing courts into a rigid inquiry that might detract from a case-by-case 
analysis.432  The fact that courts have employed differing admissibility 
standards for grand jury testimony offered against the government suggests, 
however, that a uniform “similar motive” test for grand jury testimony 
might be needed.  This test should avoid anything approaching a bright-line 
rule, and it should prevent strategic use of questioning, policy 
considerations, favoritism, or judicial discretion from influencing the 
admissibility determination. 
On remand from the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. 
Salerno, the Second Circuit panel employed a two-step “reasonable 
examiner” test that suggests a solution.433  Because the admissibility 
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inquiry for prior testimony concerns whether it is fair to hold a party to 
testimony that was developed in a previous proceeding, and it is only fair to 
do so when the opposing party had an adequate opportunity to develop the 
testimony by examination or cross-examination,434 the first step in the 
admissibility inquiry should be for the court to look at the examination that 
the prosecution actually conducted before the grand jury.435  If the 
prosecution conducted even a limited examination designed to discredit the 
exculpatory testimony with regard to the issues now relevant at trial, it 
should be very difficult for the government to argue that it lacked a motive 
to do so.436 
It is not enough, however, to stop with an inquiry into the extent of 
examination that the prosecution actually conducted.437  Rule 804(b)(1) 
admits testimony where the opportunity and motive to develop it existed, 
not merely where an actual examination or cross-examination took place.438  
This aspect of admissibility assures that strategic considerations, which 
might counsel an attorney against conducting as thorough an examination at 
the prior proceeding as he or she would conduct at trial, do not influence the 
later admissibility of the evidence.439  Therefore, where the initial inquiry 
into the questioning that was actually conducted before the grand jury 
reveals that something short of sufficient examination on the material issues 
occurred, the second step is for the court to determine whether a “similar 
motive” would have existed for examination, despite the lack of actual 
questioning on the material issues.440 
This is a difficult inquiry that goes to the heart of what it means for the 
prosecution to have a “similar motive” at the grand jury proceeding.  As 
Professor Michael Martin has explained, referring to the substantially 
similar admissibility test promulgated by the Supreme Court in its initial 
version of Rule 804(b)(1),441 
[T]he objective of the motive and interest test is to determine whether 
there is any significant reason why facts relevant to the present inquiry . . . 
would not have been elicited at the prior hearing.  A “significant reason” 
for these purposes would be one which would affect the conduct of the 
examination by a reasonable attorney in the same circumstances.  It is 
unfair to hold a party to the former examination if no reasonable attorney 
would be expected to have elicited the now-relevant facts; but if the 
circumstances were such that those facts could have been brought out if 
they were available, the present opponent can fairly be held.442 
 With respect to grand jury testimony, strategic use of questioning is one 
of the primary reasons why reasonable prosecutors do not elicit facts.  This 
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Note argues, however, that strategic considerations are not “significant” 
within the evidentiary scope of Rule 804(b)(1); hence, the “reasonable 
attorney” test should not consider a prosecutor’s motive for examination at 
the grand jury to be diminished when questioning was limited because of 
prosecutorial strategy.  A refinement of the reasonable attorney test is 
needed that can determine whether a motive existed to elicit now-relevant 
facts, but that avoids taking into consideration such things as strategic 
limitation of questioning, policies favoring either the prosecution or the 
defense, or judicial determinations concerning the merit of prior testimony. 
In his Second Circuit panel opinion on remand from the Supreme Court 
in United States v. Salerno, Judge Pratt reasoned that, if the inquiry into 
whether the prosecution actually conducted a similarly motivated grand jury 
examination on the material issues is inconclusive, then the second step is 
for the court to objectively determine “whether a reasonable examiner under 
the circumstances would have had a similar motive to examine the 
witness.”443  The purpose of this inquiry is to ensure “that the failure to 
vigorously examine the witness—for tactical reasons or otherwise—does 
not insulate the prior testimony from admission.”444  So, in the test put 
forward by the Second Circuit panel, the reasonableness determination, at 
least in the abstract,445 does not consider the strategic choices that actual 
prosecutors are likely to make.  The “similar motive” test for grand jury 
testimony offered against the government could thus be restated as follows:  
Considering the scope of the investigation and the information available to 
the prosecution at the time of questioning, the court should determine 
whether a reasonable prosecutor would have had a motive to challenge the 
testimony with respect to the issues now relevant at trial, regardless of 
whether any such challenge was forgone for strategic reasons or otherwise.  
Alternatively, the test could be stated:  Considering the scope of the 
investigation and the information available to the prosecution at the time of 
questioning, the court should determine whether a reasonable prosecutor, 
proceeding as if the witness were testifying at trial, would have had a 
motive to discredit the exculpatory testimony. 
Professor Glen Weissenberger has noted that “[t]he critical issue raised 
by Rule 804(b)(1) is whether to admit the evidence or completely sacrifice 
the testimony of the [declarant]; consequently, only genuinely dissimilar 
motives should result in exclusion.”446  This understanding of Rule 
804(b)(1) highlights the fact that the rule’s evidentiary function is to 
provide needed information to fact-finders, and not merely to ensure strict 
fairness to litigants.447  In many grand jury situations, a prosecutor’s motive 
to develop exculpatory testimony, although not as “intense” as it might be 
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at trial, would nonetheless not be “genuinely dissimilar” from the motive 
the prosecution would have at trial.448  Rather, it is simply that a low burden 
and the nature of prosecutorial power in the grand jury leave the 
prosecution with no urgent need to exercise its “motive.”449  If strategic 
considerations brought on by grand jury conditions were eliminated from 
the “similar motive” test, Rule 804(b)(1)’s evidentiary purpose could be 
better served by providing more information to the fact-finder without 
sacrificing essential fairness to the government.  After all, “[w]here [a] 
party forgoes cross-examination, it is not unfair to make him or her suffer 
the consequences.”450  Furthermore, where the prosecution has obtained 
grand jury testimony by granting immunity to the witness, it is foreseeable 
that the witness might become “unavailable” at trial if immunity is not 
extended, and, consequently, the grand jury testimony might be admissible 
pursuant to Rule 804(b)(1).  In the parallel situation concerning preliminary 
hearing testimony, it has been suggested that the defense might have a 
“motive” to cross-examine a preliminary hearing witness simply because it 
is aware that the testimony might become admissible if the witness is 
“unavailable” at trial.451  If that is so, might not the prosecution have a 
“motive” to examine an exculpatory grand jury witness to whom the 
government has granted immunity simply because it understands that the 
witness is likely to become “unavailable” if immunity is not extended to the 
trial?452 
As it generally stands, there is a discontinuity between admissibility 
determinations for preliminary hearing and grand jury testimony under Rule 
804(b)(1).453  The “reasonable examiner” test above, which does not take 
into account the strategic decisions of examiners, seems already to be 
applied by courts to preliminary hearing testimony that is offered against 
the defendant.454  But, in situations where exculpatory grand jury testimony 
is offered against the government, courts have allowed prosecutors’ 
strategic choices to influence the admissibility determination, and some 
have even favored the government by holding that the nature of grand jury 
proceedings themselves precludes finding prosecutorial motive for 
examination.455  In both grand jury and preliminary hearing situations, 
similar forces influence the extent to which an examiner is likely to 
question a witness.456  Before the grand jury, the government’s burden is 
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low and it is often in the prosecution’s interest not to reveal all that it might 
know about an investigation—not to “tip its hand”—by thoroughly 
questioning an exculpatory witness when its burden has been met.457  
Similarly, the prosecution must meet a low burden at preliminary hearings 
in criminal cases, so it is often not in the defense’s interest to discredit the 
prosecution’s inculpatory evidence using means as aggressive as it would at 
trial, where the prosecution’s higher burden favors the defense.458  Yet, 
despite the similarities between the factors influencing “motive” at these 
two proceedings, courts have treated them differently.459 
Convincing policy arguments might be made for employing Rule 
804(b)(1)’s “similar motive” test in such a way as to either support the 
activities of law enforcement or protect the interests of defendants.  For 
instance, some argue that liberally admitting grand jury testimony against 
the government would encourage prosecutors to expand the scope of grand 
jury proceedings and treat them, at least as far as witness examination is 
concerned, more like trials.  This in turn would increase the burden on the 
government with respect to conducting grand jury investigations and would 
decrease the overall effectiveness of law enforcement.460  It has also been 
argued that admitting grand jury testimony against the government when 
the witness is only realistically “unavailable” to the defense is a necessary 
measure to counterbalance the prosecution’s greater power with respect to 
obtaining evidence in the grand jury.461  Such generalized policy 
considerations, along with the strategic considerations discussed above, are 
beyond the evidentiary scope of Rule 804(b)(1), however, and should not be 
considered in the prior testimony admissibility analysis.462  If the 
reasonable examiner test that the Second Circuit panel described were 
applied to both grand jury and preliminary hearing testimony as the sole 
means by which prior testimony could be admitted, it would ensure that the 
evidentiary purpose behind Rule 804(b)(1) was met in each instance.  It 
would prevent courts from basing admissibility decisions on before-the-fact 
determinations of the truthfulness or accuracy of the testimony.  It would 
prevent courts that identify with the interests of either the government or 
the defense from favoring one or the other in admissibility determinations.  
It would screen “intensity” of motive from the “similar motive” inquiry and 
place the focus instead on a party’s reasonable opportunity to develop facts 
at the prior proceeding.  Finally, it would prevent courts from considering 
questioners’ strategic decisions in the admissibility determination.  The 
“reasonable examiner” test would direct courts instead to consider the 
circumstances that prevailed at grand jury and preliminary hearing 
proceedings—to consider what the attorneys knew at the time they 
questioned their witnesses, and whether they possessed sufficient 
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information to recognize the witnesses’ testimony as adverse and therefore 
discredit it. 
CONCLUSION 
U.S. Courts of Appeals applying Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1)’s 
“similar motive” test to grand jury testimony offered against the 
government have based their admissibility determinations on different 
factors common to grand jury examinations.  As a result, a split has 
developed between those circuit courts that have narrowly construed the 
requirement and would rarely encounter circumstances that could satisfy 
their stringent admissibility test, and those circuits that have taken a more 
expansive view of prosecutorial motive and would presumptively admit 
grand jury testimony against the government in most cases.  The primary 
factor resulting in the split is whether the court would consider a 
prosecutor’s strategic use of limited questioning at the grand jury to bear 
upon the prosecution’s “motive” for examination in the abstract.  Neither 
the narrow test, which considers such strategic use of questioning, nor the 
broad test, which dismisses it, is true to the evidentiary purposes of Rule 
804(b)(1).  The admissibility inquiry is further complicated by a seemingly 
contradictory interpretation of the “similar motive” test with respect to 
preliminary hearing testimony offered against defendants.  In those cases, 
under circumstances analogous to those present in the grand jury setting, 
courts usually have held preliminary hearing testimony admissible.  If the 
“reasonable examiner” test described by the Second Circuit panel on 
remand from the Supreme Court in United States v. Salerno were adopted 
with the explicit provision that strategic decisions to limit questioning in 
both the grand jury and preliminary hearing contexts should not influence 
courts’ “similar motive” determinations, several benefits would ensue.  
Courts would have a more uniform and predictable standard for 
determining the admissibility of grand jury testimony against the 
government; and, the standard for grand jury testimony would parallel that 
already employed for preliminary hearing testimony, where defendants’ low 
motive to challenge witnesses due to the proceeding’s low burden of proof 
does not bar admission of the testimony.  Also, application of a uniform 
“similar motive” test would allow prosecutors to more accurately predict 
when exculpatory testimony uncovered in the grand jury might later 
resurface at trial pursuant to Rule 804(b)(1).  Finally, applying the 
“reasonable examiner” test to grand jury testimony offered pursuant to Rule 
804(b)(1) would ensure that courts do not resort to impermissible discretion 
based upon the perceived merit of the contested testimony, and that they 
remain within the evidentiary confines of the rule and do not consider such 
extrinsic factors as adversarial fairness in the abstract or policy favoring 
either the government or the defense. 
